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Description
Hi, I’m seeing a certificate/TLS failure in ElectronicObserverEN that looks related to an expired locally-trusted root CA used for HTTPS interception.
Environment
- OS: Windows 11
- ElectronicObserver: latest — version (5.3.21.0)
- WebView2 Runtime (Evergreen):
144.0.3719.104 - Microsoft Edge:
144.0.3719.115 - Locale/Timezone:
ja-JP, JST (UTC+9)
Symptom
- In ElectronicObserver (WebView2), navigation fails with:
net::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID
- The same URL works in Edge (no certificate error).
Certificate findings
When checking the certificate shown inside the WebView2 view, the issuer appears as:
- Issuer:
CN=Titanium Root Certificate Authority
In Windows certificate store, I found a trusted root certificate in CurrentUser\Root (not in LocalMachine\Root):
- Subject:
CN=Titanium Root Certificate Authority - Thumbprint:
E175275DCCE339BD2C1EA5C04B261F2B84743E59 - HasPrivateKey:
True - NotBefore:
2022-11-03 15:18:21 - NotAfter:
2026-02-06 15:18:21(JST)
PowerShell output (sanitized user name):
$thumb="E175275DCCE339BD2C1EA5C04B261F2B84743E59"
"=== CurrentUser ==="
Get-ChildItem Cert:\CurrentUser\Root | ? Thumbprint -eq $thumb | fl Subject,Thumbprint,NotBefore,NotAfter
"=== LocalMachine ==="
Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root | ? Thumbprint -eq $thumb | fl Subject,Thumbprint,NotBefore,NotAfter
=== CurrentUser ===
Subject : CN=Titanium Root Certificate Authority
Thumbprint : E175275DCCE339BD2C1EA5C04B261F2B84743E59
NotBefore : 2022/11/03 15:18:21
NotAfter : 2026/02/06 15:18:21
=== LocalMachine ===
(no results)
Reproduction / behavior
- Remove the certificate from
Cert:\CurrentUser\Root(by thumbprint). - Launch ElectronicObserver.
- The app prompts to install a certificate again.
- The certificate does not automatically re-appear unless I follow the prompt.
Expected behavior
If a locally-trusted root CA is required for HTTPS interception, I’d expect:
- explicit detection of a missing / expired CA,
- clear user guidance for renew/regenerate the CA when it’s near expiry,
- documentation on scope/risk (e.g., CurrentUser only, what traffic is affected, how to remove it cleanly).
Questions / requests
- Is ElectronicObserver intentionally using a local MITM/proxy approach that requires installing a trusted root CA (showing up as
Titanium Root Certificate Authority)? - If yes, could the app:
- warn when the CA is expired / expiring soon, and
- provide a safer, clearer renewal flow and documentation?
- If a CA-less approach is feasible (e.g., WebView2 interception APIs instead of OS-trusted root CA), is there any plan to migrate?
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