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Some SAML SSO endpoints decode `RelayState` and then reflect it into the response without sanitization. If you can inject newlines and override the response `Content-Type`, you can force the browser to render attacker-controlled HTML, achieving reflected XSS.
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- Idea: abuse response-splitting via newline injection in the reflected RelayState. See also the generic notes in [CRLF injection](../crlf-0d-0a.md).
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- Works even when RelayState is base64-decoded server-side: supply a base64 that decodes to header/body injection.
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Generalized steps:
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1. Build a header/body injection sequence starting with a newline, overwrite content type to HTML, then inject HTML/JS payload:
Why it works: the server decodes `RelayState` and incorporates it into the response in a way that permits newline injection, letting the attacker influence headers and body. Forcing `Content-Type: text/html` causes the browser to render the attacker-controlled HTML from the response body.
-[Is it CitrixBleed4? Well no. Is it good? Also no. Citrix NetScaler’s Memory Leak & rXSS (CVE-2025-12101)](https://labs.watchtowr.com/is-it-citrixbleed4-well-no-is-it-good-also-no-citrix-netscalers-memory-leak-rxss-cve-2025-12101/)
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