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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: src/hardware-physical-access/physical-attacks.md
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@@ -112,9 +112,34 @@ After the tenth cycle the EC sets a flag that instructs the BIOS to wipe NVRAM a
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## Covert IR Injection Against No-Touch Exit Sensors
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### Sensor Characteristics
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- Commodity “wave-to-exit” sensors pair a near-IR LED emitter with a TV-remote style receiver module that only reports logic high after it has seen multiple pulses (~4–10) of the correct carrier (≈30 kHz).
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- A plastic shroud blocks the emitter and receiver from looking directly at each other, so the controller assumes any validated carrier came from a nearby reflection and drives a relay that opens the door strike.
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- Once the controller believes a target is present it often changes the outbound modulation envelope, but the receiver keeps accepting any burst that matches the filtered carrier.
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### Attack Workflow
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1.**Capture the emission profile** – clip a logic analyser across the controller pins to record both the pre-detection and post-detection waveforms that drive the internal IR LED.
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2.**Replay only the “post-detection” waveform** – remove/ignore the stock emitter and drive an external IR LED with the already-triggered pattern from the outset. Because the receiver only cares about pulse count/frequency, it treats the spoofed carrier as a genuine reflection and asserts the relay line.
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3.**Gate the transmission** – transmit the carrier in tuned bursts (e.g., tens of milliseconds on, similar off) to deliver the minimum pulse count without saturating the receiver’s AGC or interference handling logic. Continuous emission quickly desensitises the sensor and stops the relay from firing.
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### Long-Range Reflective Injection
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- Replacing the bench LED with a high-power IR diode, MOSFET driver, and focusing optics enables reliable triggering from ~6 m away.
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- The attacker does not need line-of-sight to the receiver aperture; aiming the beam at interior walls, shelving, or door frames that are visible through glass lets reflected energy enter the ~30° field of view and mimics a close-range hand wave.
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- Because the receivers expect only weak reflections, a much stronger external beam can bounce off multiple surfaces and still remain above the detection threshold.
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### Weaponised Attack Torch
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- Embedding the driver inside a commercial flashlight hides the tool in plain sight. Swap the visible LED for a high-power IR LED matched to the receiver’s band, add an ATtiny412 (or similar) to generate the ≈30 kHz bursts, and use a MOSFET to sink the LED current.
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- A telescopic zoom lens tightens the beam for range/precision, while a vibration motor under MCU control gives haptic confirmation that modulation is active without emitting visible light.
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- Cycling through several stored modulation patterns (slightly different carrier frequencies and envelopes) increases compatibility across rebranded sensor families, letting the operator sweep reflective surfaces until the relay audibly clicks and the door releases.
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## References
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-[Pentest Partners – “Framework 13. Press here to pwn”](https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/framework-13-press-here-to-pwn/)
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