Question about the 1 BTC mnemonic challenge — is a 3rd share published somewhere?

[chris7ph]

Hello,

I have been studying the 1 BTC Shamir Secret Sharing challenge at https://tbtc.bitaps.com/mnemonic/challenge for several months and wanted to ask directly.

The two published shares are:

• Share 1 (x=3): session cigar grape merry useful churn fatal thought very any arm unaware
• Share 2 (x=15): clock fresh security field caution effort gorilla speed plastic common tomato echo

I have conducted a thorough cryptographic analysis including:

• Decoding both shares and extracting their 16-byte entropy values (x=3: c4451d9745defe5194e707f2e1442ef6, x=15: 2b6b9b0b2af24a8d592e88a605cf9022)
• Confirming the JS implementation uses crypto.getRandomValues (proper CSPRNG)
• Testing all known implementation vulnerabilities including the pybtc Issue #23 biased RNG and the jsbtc q.includes(w) uniqueness constraint (Issue #47)
• Verifying the address bc1qyjwa0tf0en4x09magpuwmt2smpsrlaxwn85lh6 still holds ~1 BTC
• Mathematically confirming that 2-of-3 Shamir shares provide perfect information-theoretic secrecy

All attack vectors are exhausted. The implementation is mathematically sound.

I have two simple questions:

1. Is the challenge intended to be solvable, and if so — is there a 3rd share published somewhere (on-chain, in a blog post, in the tool source, or elsewhere) that we have not found?
2. Is the challenge still actively maintained, or should we consider the 1 BTC permanently locked?

Thank you for the excellent work on the bitaps ecosystem and the jsbtc library.

[ChrisYatesUK]

I don't think the challenge is to try and discover a 3rd share in order to access the wallet containing the 1 BTC.
I've understood it to be to try and discover any weaknesses & vulnerabilities in the way those shares would have been generated by the website and also any implemented libraries

Hello,

I have been studying the 1 BTC Shamir Secret Sharing challenge at https://tbtc.bitaps.com/mnemonic/challenge for several months and wanted to ask directly.

The two published shares are:

• Share 1 (x=3): session cigar grape merry useful churn fatal thought very any arm unaware
• Share 2 (x=15): clock fresh security field caution effort gorilla speed plastic common tomato echo

I have conducted a thorough cryptographic analysis including:

• Decoding both shares and extracting their 16-byte entropy values (x=3: c4451d9745defe5194e707f2e1442ef6, x=15: 2b6b9b0b2af24a8d592e88a605cf9022)
• Confirming the JS implementation uses crypto.getRandomValues (proper CSPRNG)
• Testing all known implementation vulnerabilities including the pybtc Issue #23 biased RNG and the jsbtc q.includes(w) uniqueness constraint (Issue #47)
• Verifying the address bc1qyjwa0tf0en4x09magpuwmt2smpsrlaxwn85lh6 still holds ~1 BTC
• Mathematically confirming that 2-of-3 Shamir shares provide perfect information-theoretic secrecy

All attack vectors are exhausted. The implementation is mathematically sound.

I have two simple questions:

1. Is the challenge intended to be solvable, and if so — is there a 3rd share published somewhere (on-chain, in a blog post, in the tool source, or elsewhere) that we have not found?
2. Is the challenge still actively maintained, or should we consider the 1 BTC permanently locked?

Thank you for the excellent work on the bitaps ecosystem and the jsbtc library.

Hello,

I have been studying the 1 BTC Shamir Secret Sharing challenge at https://tbtc.bitaps.com/mnemonic/challenge for several months and wanted to ask directly.

The two published shares are:

• Share 1 (x=3): session cigar grape merry useful churn fatal thought very any arm unaware
• Share 2 (x=15): clock fresh security field caution effort gorilla speed plastic common tomato echo

I have conducted a thorough cryptographic analysis including:

• Decoding both shares and extracting their 16-byte entropy values (x=3: c4451d9745defe5194e707f2e1442ef6, x=15: 2b6b9b0b2af24a8d592e88a605cf9022)
• Confirming the JS implementation uses crypto.getRandomValues (proper CSPRNG)
• Testing all known implementation vulnerabilities including the pybtc Issue #23 biased RNG and the jsbtc q.includes(w) uniqueness constraint (Issue #47)
• Verifying the address bc1qyjwa0tf0en4x09magpuwmt2smpsrlaxwn85lh6 still holds ~1 BTC
• Mathematically confirming that 2-of-3 Shamir shares provide perfect information-theoretic secrecy

All attack vectors are exhausted. The implementation is mathematically sound.

I have two simple questions:

1. Is the challenge intended to be solvable, and if so — is there a 3rd share published somewhere (on-chain, in a blog post, in the tool source, or elsewhere) that we have not found?
2. Is the challenge still actively maintained, or should we consider the 1 BTC permanently locked?

Thank you for the excellent work on the bitaps ecosystem and the jsbtc library.

[chris7ph]

oh ok