You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: _posts/en/newsletters/2025-09-26-newsletter.md
+27-27Lines changed: 27 additions & 27 deletions
Display the source diff
Display the rich diff
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ describing notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure software.
22
22
0.12 or greater. The vulnerability allowed an attacker to broadcast
23
23
an old commitment transaction to steal all current funds from a
24
24
channel. In addition to fixing the vulnerability, Eclair developers
25
-
added a comprehensive testing suite designed to catch similar problems.
25
+
added a comprehensive testing suite designed to catch similar problems. {% assign timestamp="18:50" %}
26
26
27
27
-**Research into feerate settings:** Daniela Brozzoni [posted][brozzoni
28
28
feefilter] to Delving Bitcoin the results of a scan of almost 30,000
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ describing notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure software.
42
42
value Bitcoin Core sets, through rounding, when the node is more than
43
43
100 blocks behind the tip of the chain and is focused on receiving
44
44
block data rather than transactions that might be confirmed in later
45
-
blocks.
45
+
blocks. {% assign timestamp="0:35" %}
46
46
47
47
## Selected Q&A from Bitcoin Stack Exchange
48
48
@@ -57,68 +57,68 @@ answers posted since our last update.*
57
57
58
58
-[Implications of OP_RETURN changes in upcoming Bitcoin Core version 30.0?]({{bse}}127895)
59
59
Pieter Wuille describes his perspectives on the effectiveness and drawbacks of
60
-
using [mempool and relay policy][policy series] to affect the contents of mined blocks.
60
+
using [mempool and relay policy][policy series] to affect the contents of mined blocks. {% assign timestamp="28:27" %}
61
61
62
62
-[If OP_RETURN relay limits are ineffective, why remove the safeguard instead of keeping it as a default discouragement?]({{bse}}127904)
63
63
Antoine Poinsot explains the malincentive created by the current OP_RETURN
64
-
default limit value in Bitcoin Core and the rationale for removing it.
64
+
default limit value in Bitcoin Core and the rationale for removing it. {% assign timestamp="42:12" %}
65
65
66
66
-[What are the worst-case stress scenarios from uncapped OP_RETURNs in Bitcoin Core v30?]({{bse}}127914)
67
67
Vojtěch Strnad and Pieter Wuille respond to a list of extreme scenarios that
68
-
might occur with the OP_RETURN limit policy default setting changing.
68
+
might occur with the OP_RETURN limit policy default setting changing. {% assign timestamp="43:25" %}
69
69
70
70
-[If OP_RETURN needed more room, why was the 80-byte cap removed instead of being raised to 160?]({{bse}}127915)
71
71
Ava Chow and Antoine Poinsot outline considerations against a 160-byte default
72
72
OP_RETURN value including an aversion to continually setting the cap, existing
73
73
large miners already bypassing the cap, and risks of not anticipating future
74
-
on-chain activity.
74
+
on-chain activity. {% assign timestamp="50:39" %}
75
75
76
76
-[If arbitrary data is inevitable, does removing OP_RETURN limits shift demand toward more harmful storage methods (like UTXO-inflating addresses)?]({{bse}}127916)
77
77
Ava Chow points out that dropping the OP_RETURN limit provides incentives
78
-
to use a less harmful alternative for output data storage in certain situations.
78
+
to use a less harmful alternative for output data storage in certain situations. {% assign timestamp="59:48" %}
79
79
80
80
-[If OP_RETURN uncapping doesn’t increase the UTXO set, how does it still contribute to blockchain bloat and centralization pressure?]({{bse}}127912)
81
81
Ava Chow explains how increased use of OP_RETURN outputs affects the resource
82
-
utilization of Bitcoin nodes.
82
+
utilization of Bitcoin nodes. {% assign timestamp="1:00:17" %}
83
83
84
84
-[How does uncapping OP_RETURN impact long-term fee-market quality and security budget?]({{bse}}127906)
85
85
Ava Chow answers a series of questions about hypothetical OP_RETURN usage and
86
-
its impact on future Bitcoin mining revenues.
86
+
its impact on future Bitcoin mining revenues. {% assign timestamp="1:02:11" %}
87
87
88
88
-[Assurance blockchain will not suffer from illegal content with 100KB OP_RETURN?]({{bse}}127958)
89
89
User jb55 provides several examples of potential encoding schemes for data
90
90
concluding "So no, in general you can't really stop these kinds of things in a
0 commit comments