From d99e13348d819f9b9957e6d0505e48e6757df06f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CM Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 12:43:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Create bsip-0088.md --- bsip-0088.md | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+) create mode 100644 bsip-0088.md diff --git a/bsip-0088.md b/bsip-0088.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c093884 --- /dev/null +++ b/bsip-0088.md @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ + BSIP: 0088 + Title: Increase maximum total Bitshares supply to grow the reserve pool fund + Authors: R + Status: Draft + Type: Protocol + Created: 2024-04-18 + +# Abstract + +Currently the Bitshares reserve pool grows through the collection of BTS fees for broadcast operations. + +This BSIP proposes to substantially raise the amount of BTS tokens held in the reserve pool through a possible future core mandatory upgrade. + +# Motivation + +With a larger amount of BTS in the reserve pool, we can afford to pay witnesses at a higher rate, encouraging greater witness election campaigning & improving competition for these roles, strengthening the DPOS consensus mechanism. + +With a larger reserve pool the development of core code and next-gen user interfaces can be funded for full-time development, as opposed to on a voluntary basis. + +# Rational + +The current circulating supply of BTS is: 2,995,301,686 BTS +The max circulating supply of BTS is: 3,600,570,502 BTS + +Meaning there's 605m BTS in reserves (16.82% of total supply). + +Considering the market cap on coinmarketcap is calculated from the circulating supply, issuing additional BTS supply to the reserves does not directly affect the market cap calculation, so even a large increase in max total supply will not directly alter the market cap calculation. + +Competitor cryptocurrencies such as Dogecoin have no maximum total supply limit; there is real market tolerance for a growing core token supply. + +Initial crypto whitepaper economics can change, the fees are regularly changed by committee decision as the price of BTS fluctuates for example. + +Fundraising through any other means introduces various forms of risks, whether that's regulatory risk, centralized counterparty risks or can suffer from lack of sufficient participation. + +There's a great deal of historical precedent for traditional publicly traded companies to issue additional shares for open market purchase, in order to fund their continued operations, this proposal is somewhat similar except the increased reserve pool isn't immediately liquid - approved worker proposals would be required to make the reserve funds liquid. + +By democratically distributing these newly raised funds through the worker proposal system we will be improving the decentralization of the network. At the moment there are several centralized exchange accounts with a substantial amount of BTS in their balances, by distributing worker funds to key stakeholders these whale accounts power is reduced substantially. + +# Specifications + +Create a worker proposal to evaluate whether people are for or against such an increase in core token supply for reserve pool purposes. + +If it passes, create secondary worker proposals to vote on the amount to increase the total supply by. + +Considering the core token is not owned by the committee-account, but rather owned by the null-account, the asset settings cannot be easily changed; the increase in BTS total supply (not circulating supply) would need to be introduced by a core code change and supported by the witnesses. + +# Discussion + +How frequently would you consider such an increase in total core token supply? + +How much would you tolerate the token supply increasing by? + +Would you prefer a large increase in total supply every 10 years (or so), or a smaller amount every year instead? What kind of increase schedule is optimal? + +You could argue that a large increase in max total supply could influence the price of BTS to decrease, however we have already sustained such downwards price action over the years without spending these reserve funds; risking going a bit lower in order to sustain years of continuous development and network operation is a worthwhile risk. + +If you're someone who has put off approving worker proposals out of fear of the reserve pool running out, would a larger reserve pool settle your worries? + +If you're someone who is afraid of large CEX whale accounts and the potential power they could weild, would the distribution of additional funds to key stakeholders in an attempt to even the DPOS playing field reduce your fear of these CEX? + +Rather than manually intervening in the reserve pool, should the committee instead substantially increase fees (such as transfers) to grow the reserve pool at these low prices? Transfer fees between CEX for example could be made more costly. + +If you're not participating in the DPOS voting system, would this encourage you to participate more? BTS held on CEX have no BSIP vote weight, thus have no say in this matter. + +Bitsharestalk thread: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,34038.new.html#new + +# Summary for Shareholders + +Potential increase in the total supply of core BTS tokens; this would pose a change to the original whitepaper economics. + +New supply would not be immediately liquid. + +New supply would become liquid through voted upon worker proposal payouts over time and potentially increased witness pay rates by the committee. + +Greater competition for witness spots will improve DPOS reliability and resiliency. + +Greater funding of core and UI development from the reserve pool through worker proposals will benefit the Bitshares blockchain and yourself. Full time dedicated development will lead to compounding improvements for open source project deliverables. + +May set a precedent for future total supply increases if/when a similar situation arises in the future. + +BSIP proposes multiple on-chain votes before any action is taken, to maximize transparency. + +A future greater balance held by developers and witnesses through witness pay and worker proposal payout will improve decentralization of the network, and will lower the potential influence which large centralized exchange accounts could have over the chain. + +Motivational music: https://app.suno.ai/song/be25a104-5131-4e80-846a-4592b0fe26a3/ \ No newline at end of file From e031923f7d39bc059680be36c5a10820b1814f87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: R Date: Sat, 1 Mar 2025 17:02:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Update bsip-0088.md --- bsip-0088.md | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/bsip-0088.md b/bsip-0088.md index c093884..7ce6ae5 100644 --- a/bsip-0088.md +++ b/bsip-0088.md @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ BSIP: 0088 - Title: Increase maximum total Bitshares supply to grow the reserve pool fund + Title: Substantially increase Bitshares' maximum total supply, significantly growing the reserve pool fund. Authors: R Status: Draft Type: Protocol @@ -7,15 +7,16 @@ # Abstract -Currently the Bitshares reserve pool grows through the collection of BTS fees for broadcast operations. +Currently the Bitshares reserve pool grows through the collection of BTS fees for broadcast operations, however there are dwindling funds. This BSIP proposes to substantially raise the amount of BTS tokens held in the reserve pool through a possible future core mandatory upgrade. # Motivation -With a larger amount of BTS in the reserve pool, we can afford to pay witnesses at a higher rate, encouraging greater witness election campaigning & improving competition for these roles, strengthening the DPOS consensus mechanism. - -With a larger reserve pool the development of core code and next-gen user interfaces can be funded for full-time development, as opposed to on a voluntary basis. +With a larger amount of BTS in the reserve pool, we can: +* Pay witnesses at a higher rate, encouraging greater DPOS activity, strengthening the consensus mechanism. +* Pay worker proposals which fund the development of next-gen core code and user interfaces in a full-time capacity. +* Tackle stakeholder project apathy # Rational @@ -24,62 +25,54 @@ The max circulating supply of BTS is: 3,600,570,502 BTS Meaning there's 605m BTS in reserves (16.82% of total supply). -Considering the market cap on coinmarketcap is calculated from the circulating supply, issuing additional BTS supply to the reserves does not directly affect the market cap calculation, so even a large increase in max total supply will not directly alter the market cap calculation. - -Competitor cryptocurrencies such as Dogecoin have no maximum total supply limit; there is real market tolerance for a growing core token supply. +Considering the market cap on coinmarketcap is calculated from the circulating supply, issuing additional BTS supply to the reserves does not directly affect the market cap calculation, therefore a substantial increase in maximum total supply does not directly affect the price. -Initial crypto whitepaper economics can change, the fees are regularly changed by committee decision as the price of BTS fluctuates for example. +Competitor cryptocurrencies such as Dogecoin have no maximum total supply limit; there is real market tolerance for a larger core token supply. -Fundraising through any other means introduces various forms of risks, whether that's regulatory risk, centralized counterparty risks or can suffer from lack of sufficient participation. +Initial crypto whitepaper economics can change, e.g. the fees are regularly changed the Bitshares committee as the price of BTS fluctuates, therefore proposing to change this total supply variable shouldn't be out of the equation. -There's a great deal of historical precedent for traditional publicly traded companies to issue additional shares for open market purchase, in order to fund their continued operations, this proposal is somewhat similar except the increased reserve pool isn't immediately liquid - approved worker proposals would be required to make the reserve funds liquid. +There's a great deal of historical precedent of publicly traded companies issuing additional shares to fund their continued operations; this proposal is similar except that Bitshares is a DAC, and the increased total supply wouldn't be liquid - worker proposals would be needed to make the funds liquid. -By democratically distributing these newly raised funds through the worker proposal system we will be improving the decentralization of the network. At the moment there are several centralized exchange accounts with a substantial amount of BTS in their balances, by distributing worker funds to key stakeholders these whale accounts power is reduced substantially. +By democratically distributing these newly raised funds through the worker proposal system we will be improving the decentralization of the network. At the moment there are several centralized exchange accounts with a substantial amount of BTS in their balances, by distributing worker funds to key stakeholders these whale accounts power are reduced substantially. # Specifications +## Option A: + Create a worker proposal to evaluate whether people are for or against such an increase in core token supply for reserve pool purposes. If it passes, create secondary worker proposals to vote on the amount to increase the total supply by. -Considering the core token is not owned by the committee-account, but rather owned by the null-account, the asset settings cannot be easily changed; the increase in BTS total supply (not circulating supply) would need to be introduced by a core code change and supported by the witnesses. +## Option B: -# Discussion +Skip directly to voting on a worker proposal to increase maximum total supply to **100 Billion BTS**. -How frequently would you consider such an increase in total core token supply? +## How to change the maximum total supply -How much would you tolerate the token supply increasing by? +Considering the core token is not owned by the committee-account, but rather owned by the null-account, the asset settings cannot be easily changed; the increase in BTS total supply (not circulating supply) would need to be introduced by a core mandatory code change and supported by all witnesses. -Would you prefer a large increase in total supply every 10 years (or so), or a smaller amount every year instead? What kind of increase schedule is optimal? +# Discussion -You could argue that a large increase in max total supply could influence the price of BTS to decrease, however we have already sustained such downwards price action over the years without spending these reserve funds; risking going a bit lower in order to sustain years of continuous development and network operation is a worthwhile risk. +How much would you tolerate the token supply increasing by? If you're someone who has put off approving worker proposals out of fear of the reserve pool running out, would a larger reserve pool settle your worries? -If you're someone who is afraid of large CEX whale accounts and the potential power they could weild, would the distribution of additional funds to key stakeholders in an attempt to even the DPOS playing field reduce your fear of these CEX? - -Rather than manually intervening in the reserve pool, should the committee instead substantially increase fees (such as transfers) to grow the reserve pool at these low prices? Transfer fees between CEX for example could be made more costly. - -If you're not participating in the DPOS voting system, would this encourage you to participate more? BTS held on CEX have no BSIP vote weight, thus have no say in this matter. +If you're someone who is afraid of large CEX whale accounts and the potential power they could weild, would the distribution of additional funds to key stakeholders in an attempt to even the DPOS playing field help ease your concerns? Bitsharestalk thread: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,34038.new.html#new -# Summary for Shareholders - -Potential increase in the total supply of core BTS tokens; this would pose a change to the original whitepaper economics. - -New supply would not be immediately liquid. +# Summary for Stakeholders -New supply would become liquid through voted upon worker proposal payouts over time and potentially increased witness pay rates by the committee. +Proposed increase to the total supply of core BTS tokens; this would pose a static change to the original whitepaper economics. -Greater competition for witness spots will improve DPOS reliability and resiliency. +New supply would not be liquid, they'd be safe within the reserve pool. -Greater funding of core and UI development from the reserve pool through worker proposals will benefit the Bitshares blockchain and yourself. Full time dedicated development will lead to compounding improvements for open source project deliverables. +New supply becomes liquid through voted upon worker proposal payouts over time and potentially through increased witness pay rates set by the Bitshares committee. -May set a precedent for future total supply increases if/when a similar situation arises in the future. +Greater competition for witness spots will improve DPOS reliability and resiliency, tackling DPOS apathy. -BSIP proposes multiple on-chain votes before any action is taken, to maximize transparency. +Greater funding of core and UI development from the reserve pool through worker proposals will benefit the Bitshares blockchain. Full time dedicated development will lead to compounding improvements for open source project deliverables. -A future greater balance held by developers and witnesses through witness pay and worker proposal payout will improve decentralization of the network, and will lower the potential influence which large centralized exchange accounts could have over the chain. +A future greater balance held by developers and witnesses through witness pay and worker proposal payout will improve decentralization of the network, and will lower the influence that large CEX accounts have over the Bitshares blockchain. -Motivational music: https://app.suno.ai/song/be25a104-5131-4e80-846a-4592b0fe26a3/ \ No newline at end of file +Motivational music: https://app.suno.ai/song/be25a104-5131-4e80-846a-4592b0fe26a3/