diff --git a/security/cert/auth.go b/security/cert/auth.go
index 7c21b01f..4a9469bd 100644
--- a/security/cert/auth.go
+++ b/security/cert/auth.go
@@ -134,6 +134,17 @@ func (c *Authority) VerifyQuorumCert(qc hotstuff.QuorumCert) error {
 	if !ok {
 		return fmt.Errorf("block not found: %v", qc.BlockHash())
 	}
+
+	// Prevent signature replay attacks: QC.View must match Block.View.
+	// Without this check, an attacker could take signatures from a legitimate QC
+	// (e.g., View 10) and create a fake QC claiming a much higher view (e.g., View 100).
+	// Since signatures only cover block.ToBytes() (which includes block.View),
+	// changing QC.View alone would not invalidate the signature.
+	// This allows "time-warp" attacks that can manipulate HighQC and disrupt consensus.
+	if qc.View() != block.View() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("QC view %d does not match block view %d (possible signature replay attack)", qc.View(), block.View())
+	}
+
 	return c.Verify(qc.Signature(), block.ToBytes())
 }
 
diff --git a/security/cert/signature_scope_test.go b/security/cert/signature_scope_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ee587c8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/cert/signature_scope_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package cert_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/relab/hotstuff"
+	"github.com/relab/hotstuff/internal/testutil"
+	"github.com/relab/hotstuff/security/crypto"
+)
+
+// TestVerifyQuorumCert_SignatureReplayAttack tests that QC verification rejects
+// forged QCs where the View field has been tampered while reusing valid signatures.
+//
+// Attack scenario:
+//  1. Attacker obtains a legitimate QC for Block A at View 10
+//  2. Attacker creates a fake QC with: same signatures, same BlockHash, but View=100
+//  3. If verification only checks block content (not view), the fake QC passes
+//
+// This test ensures the fix in VerifyQuorumCert correctly validates QC.View == Block.View.
+func TestVerifyQuorumCert_SignatureReplayAttack(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, cryptoName := range []string{crypto.NameECDSA, crypto.NameEDDSA, crypto.NameBLS12} {
+		t.Run(cryptoName, func(t *testing.T) {
+			const numReplicas = 4
+			const originalView = hotstuff.View(10)
+			const fakeView = hotstuff.View(100)
+
+			// Setup: Create a legitimate QC at View 10
+			dummies := testutil.NewEssentialsSet(t, numReplicas, cryptoName)
+			signers := dummies.Signers()
+
+			genesisQC := hotstuff.NewQuorumCert(nil, 0, hotstuff.GetGenesis().Hash())
+			block := hotstuff.NewBlock(
+				hotstuff.GetGenesis().Hash(),
+				genesisQC,
+				nil,
+				originalView,
+				hotstuff.ID(1),
+			)
+
+			for _, dummy := range dummies {
+				dummy.Blockchain().Store(block)
+			}
+
+			// Create legitimate QC
+			legitimateQC := testutil.CreateQC(t, block, signers...)
+
+			// Verify original QC is valid
+			if err := signers[0].VerifyQuorumCert(legitimateQC); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Legitimate QC should be valid: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Attack: Create fake QC with tampered View but same signatures
+			fakeQC := hotstuff.NewQuorumCert(
+				legitimateQC.Signature(),
+				fakeView, // Tampered: View 10 -> View 100
+				legitimateQC.BlockHash(),
+			)
+
+			// Verification should fail for the tampered QC
+			err := signers[0].VerifyQuorumCert(fakeQC)
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Errorf("VULNERABILITY: QC with tampered View (%d->%d) was accepted; "+
+					"VerifyQuorumCert should reject QCs where QC.View != Block.View",
+					originalView, fakeView)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}