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## Contents
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To address challenges 5 and 6, this repository contains a freely accessible, unencumbered specification of **[Hierarchical Deterministic Keys](draft-dijkhuis-cfrg-hierarchical-deterministic-keys.md)**. This enables an EU Digital Identity Wallet deployment that distributes key management efficiently:
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To address challenges 5 and 6, this repository contains a freely accessible, unencumbered specification of **[Hierarchical Deterministic Keys](draft-dijkhuis-cfrg-hdkeys.md)**. This enables an EU Digital Identity Wallet deployment that distributes key management efficiently:
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title: "SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters, Version 2.0"
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The following example illustrates the use of key derivation. An HDK tree is defined by an initial public key and a seed value, which is a byte array containing sufficient entropy. Now tree nodes are constructed as follows.
The solution instance computes the Level 0 HDK at the root node using a deterministic function called HDK-Root. The HDK consists of a key pair `(pk0, sk0)`, and a byte string `salt0` to derive next-level keys.
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In secure
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cryptographic
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device
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┌───────────┐
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│sk_device ┼─────────────┐
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└───────────┘│
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─────────────│
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HDK in │
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solution │
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instance ▼┌───────────┐
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┌───────────┐ HDK-Authenticate─►│device_data│
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│pk │▲▲└───────────┘
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└───────────┘││
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┌───────────┐││
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│sk ┼───────┘│
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└───────────┘│
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─────────────│
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┌───────────┐│
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│reader_data┼─────────────┘
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└───────────┘
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+-----------+
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|sk_device +-------------+
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+-----------+|
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-------------|
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HDK in |
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solution |
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instance v+-----------+
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+-----------+ HDK-Authenticate->|device_data|
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|pk |^^+-----------+
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+-----------+||
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+-----------+||
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|sk +-------+|
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+-----------+|
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-------------|
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+-----------+|
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|reader_data+-------------+
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+-----------+
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~~~
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Blinding methods can be constructed such that the secure cryptographic device does not need to be designed for it. In such cases, `sk_device` does not contain the value of the private device key but a reference to it.
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Inputs:
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- sk_device, a (reference to a) device private key.
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- sk_hdk, an HDK private key.
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- reader_data, a byte string of solution instance-specific reader data.
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- reader_data, a byte string of solution instance-specific data.
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Outputs:
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- device_data, a byte string of device data for proving possession.
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