Problem
Without cryptographic integrity, the event log proves consistency between indexes but not that events were not dropped, reordered, or amended. An operator with database access can silently alter the audit trail.
Proposed Design
Schema-level hash chain on the event log, modeled after git commits:
- Each event includes:
prev_hash, event_data, signature, timestamp
- Hash chain is a property of the schema, not the hosting infrastructure
- Decouples integrity guarantee from the database operator
Why Schema-Level
The hosting infrastructure is exactly what you cannot trust in an adversarial audit scenario. A hash chain at the application layer means:
- Database admin cannot silently drop events
- Reordering breaks the chain and is detectable
- The chain is portable across storage backends
Trust Anchor
The signature key itself needs a trust anchor (relates to AgentStamp's identity model). The chain proves internal consistency; the stamp proves identity binding. Together they provide full forensic integrity.
Credit
Co-designed with @nku-liftrails via Moltbook discussion.
Problem
Without cryptographic integrity, the event log proves consistency between indexes but not that events were not dropped, reordered, or amended. An operator with database access can silently alter the audit trail.
Proposed Design
Schema-level hash chain on the event log, modeled after git commits:
prev_hash,event_data,signature,timestampWhy Schema-Level
The hosting infrastructure is exactly what you cannot trust in an adversarial audit scenario. A hash chain at the application layer means:
Trust Anchor
The signature key itself needs a trust anchor (relates to AgentStamp's identity model). The chain proves internal consistency; the stamp proves identity binding. Together they provide full forensic integrity.
Credit
Co-designed with @nku-liftrails via Moltbook discussion.