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Security: Lykhoyda/ask-llm

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Only the latest minor version of each published package receives security fixes. Update with:

npm install -g ask-gemini-mcp@latest ask-codex-mcp@latest ask-ollama-mcp@latest ask-llm-mcp@latest

For the Claude Code plugin, run /plugin update ask-llm from inside Claude Code.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities.

Use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting to report privately. We aim to respond within 7 days.

Include in your report:

  • Affected package and version (ask-gemini-mcp, ask-codex-mcp, ask-ollama-mcp, ask-llm-mcp, or @ask-llm/plugin)
  • A clear description of the issue
  • Reproduction steps or proof-of-concept if possible
  • Your suggested mitigation if you have one
  • Whether you'd like credit in the advisory

Threat model

The MCP server runs locally as a subprocess of the user's MCP client (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.) with the user's privileges. Provider CLIs (gemini, codex) and Ollama are trusted dependencies.

In scope

  • Command injection via tool arguments (prompt, model, includeDirs, sessionId)
  • Path traversal via @file syntax or --include-directories
  • Information disclosure — secrets leaking into logs, error responses, or stderr that is propagated back to the MCP client
  • Plugin hooks executing untrusted shell content (the PreToolUse Bash matcher in packages/claude-plugin/hooks/hooks.json)
  • Workspace-protocol bundling bugs that could cause unintended code to be installed at npm install time (see ADR-052)
  • Temp file handling — leakage of staged diffs or session content from /tmp/ask-llm-* files
  • Insecure defaults in the commandExecutor spawn options or the resolved PATH (ADR-047)

Out of scope

  • Vulnerabilities in upstream provider CLIs — report to Google (Gemini), OpenAI (Codex), or Ollama directly
  • Vulnerabilities in @modelcontextprotocol/sdk — report to the MCP project
  • Issues that already require local code execution as the same user the MCP server runs as (the MCP server is not a privilege boundary — it already runs with your full user privileges)
  • Vulnerabilities in the user's MCP client (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, etc.)
  • Quality-of-output issues with LLM responses (prompt injection from a file the user explicitly asked to read is a usage concern, not a vulnerability in this project)

Disclosure timeline

Day Action
0 Report received via GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting
≤ 7 Initial response with severity assessment
≤ 30 Fix developed, advisory drafted
≤ 90 Coordinated disclosure and patch release (or earlier if a fix is ready and the issue is being actively exploited)

Acknowledgments

Reporters who follow coordinated disclosure are credited in the published GitHub Security Advisory unless they request anonymity.

There aren’t any published security advisories