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fix(deploy): use execFileSync to avoid command injection (Fixes #55)#110

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deepujain:fix/55-deploy-execFileSync
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fix(deploy): use execFileSync to avoid command injection (Fixes #55)#110
deepujain wants to merge 0 commit intoNVIDIA:mainfrom
deepujain:fix/55-deploy-execFileSync

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@deepujain
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Summary

Replaces execSync with execFileSync / spawnSync in the deploy path so user-controlled input (instance name) is not passed through a shell. This mitigates command injection if the instance name were ever sourced from untrusted input.

Fixes #55.

Changes

  • bin/nemoclaw.js
    • which brev: execSync("which brev", ...)execFileSync("which", ["brev"], ...) so no shell is spawned.
    • brev ls: execSync("brev ls 2>&1", ...)spawnSync("brev", ["ls"], { encoding: "utf-8", shell: false }) and combine stdout + stderr programmatically to detect existing instances.
    • SSH reachability: execSync(\ssh ... ${name} 'echo ok'`, ...)execFileSync("ssh", ["-o", "ConnectTimeout=5", "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=no", name, "echo ok"], ...)` so the instance name is a single argument and not interpreted by a shell.

Testing

  • npm test — all tests pass. No new unit tests (deploy path is integration-only; security hardening).

@wscurran wscurran added security Something isn't secure priority: high Important issue that should be resolved in the next release enhancement: feature Use this label to identify requests for new capabilities in NemoClaw. labels Mar 19, 2026
ericksoa added a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 21, 2026
Comprehensive fix for shell injection vulnerabilities where user input
(instance names, sandbox names, model names, API keys) was interpolated
unsanitized into shell commands via run()/runInteractive()/execSync().

Changes:
- Add shellQuote() and validateName() to runner.js as shared utilities
- Replace all execSync() with execFileSync() in deploy (no shell)
- Apply shellQuote() to every user-controlled variable in shell commands
  across nemoclaw.js, onboard.js, nim.js, policies.js
- Add RFC 1123 name validation at CLI dispatch for sandbox/instance names
- Fix path traversal in policies.js loadPreset()
- Replace predictable temp file with mkdtempSync()
- Remove duplicate shellQuote() definitions (now single source in runner.js)
- 9 new test cases for shellQuote, validateName, and path traversal

Supersedes #55, #110, #475, #540, #48, #171.
@cv
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cv commented Mar 21, 2026

@deepujain — the execFileSync change to prevent command injection is exactly the kind of hardening we want. Quick ask: this repo has moved forward quite a bit (new CI, features, refactors), so could you rebase this branch on the latest main? That'll let us review it against the current codebase. You've been a consistent contributor and we really appreciate it!

kjw3 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 21, 2026
* security: fix command injection across all CLI entry points

Comprehensive fix for shell injection vulnerabilities where user input
(instance names, sandbox names, model names, API keys) was interpolated
unsanitized into shell commands via run()/runInteractive()/execSync().

Changes:
- Add shellQuote() and validateName() to runner.js as shared utilities
- Replace all execSync() with execFileSync() in deploy (no shell)
- Apply shellQuote() to every user-controlled variable in shell commands
  across nemoclaw.js, onboard.js, nim.js, policies.js
- Add RFC 1123 name validation at CLI dispatch for sandbox/instance names
- Fix path traversal in policies.js loadPreset()
- Replace predictable temp file with mkdtempSync()
- Remove duplicate shellQuote() definitions (now single source in runner.js)
- 9 new test cases for shellQuote, validateName, and path traversal

Supersedes #55, #110, #475, #540, #48, #171.

* fix: deduplicate shellQuote in local-inference.js

Import shellQuote from runner.js instead of defining a local copy.
Single source of truth for shell quoting across the codebase.

* security: fix telegram bridge injection + add regression guards

Telegram bridge:
- Replace execSync with execFileSync for ssh-config retrieval
- shellQuote message, API key, and session ID in remote command
- Validate SANDBOX_NAME at startup
- Use mkdtempSync for temp SSH config (not predictable path)

Regression tests:
- nemoclaw.js must not use execSync
- Single shellQuote definition in bin/
- CLI rejects malicious sandbox names (e2e, no mocking)
- telegram-bridge.js validates SANDBOX_NAME and avoids execSync

* security: address CodeRabbit review findings on shell injection PR

- Shell-quote secret values written to .env before remote source
- Wrap scp upload in try/finally to guarantee temp secret cleanup
- Shell-quote CHAT_UI_URL and NVIDIA_API_KEY env args in onboard
- Replace predictable Date.now() temp path with mkdtempSync in policies
- Strengthen e2e test with canary file to prove payload never executes
- Fix merge-introduced test expectations for shellQuote single-quote format
jnun pushed a commit to jnun/EasyClaw that referenced this pull request Mar 21, 2026
)

* security: fix command injection across all CLI entry points

Comprehensive fix for shell injection vulnerabilities where user input
(instance names, sandbox names, model names, API keys) was interpolated
unsanitized into shell commands via run()/runInteractive()/execSync().

Changes:
- Add shellQuote() and validateName() to runner.js as shared utilities
- Replace all execSync() with execFileSync() in deploy (no shell)
- Apply shellQuote() to every user-controlled variable in shell commands
  across nemoclaw.js, onboard.js, nim.js, policies.js
- Add RFC 1123 name validation at CLI dispatch for sandbox/instance names
- Fix path traversal in policies.js loadPreset()
- Replace predictable temp file with mkdtempSync()
- Remove duplicate shellQuote() definitions (now single source in runner.js)
- 9 new test cases for shellQuote, validateName, and path traversal

Supersedes NVIDIA#55, NVIDIA#110, NVIDIA#475, NVIDIA#540, NVIDIA#48, NVIDIA#171.

* fix: deduplicate shellQuote in local-inference.js

Import shellQuote from runner.js instead of defining a local copy.
Single source of truth for shell quoting across the codebase.

* security: fix telegram bridge injection + add regression guards

Telegram bridge:
- Replace execSync with execFileSync for ssh-config retrieval
- shellQuote message, API key, and session ID in remote command
- Validate SANDBOX_NAME at startup
- Use mkdtempSync for temp SSH config (not predictable path)

Regression tests:
- nemoclaw.js must not use execSync
- Single shellQuote definition in bin/
- CLI rejects malicious sandbox names (e2e, no mocking)
- telegram-bridge.js validates SANDBOX_NAME and avoids execSync

* security: address CodeRabbit review findings on shell injection PR

- Shell-quote secret values written to .env before remote source
- Wrap scp upload in try/finally to guarantee temp secret cleanup
- Shell-quote CHAT_UI_URL and NVIDIA_API_KEY env args in onboard
- Replace predictable Date.now() temp path with mkdtempSync in policies
- Strengthen e2e test with canary file to prove payload never executes
- Fix merge-introduced test expectations for shellQuote single-quote format
@deepujain deepujain closed this Mar 21, 2026
@deepujain deepujain force-pushed the fix/55-deploy-execFileSync branch from 5491424 to 1dbf82f Compare March 21, 2026 22:32
@deepujain
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Rebased on latest main: the commit drops cleanly because all changes from this PR were already included in the comprehensive security fix #584 (merged Mar 21). Closing as superseded. Thanks @ericksoa for the thorough broader fix and @cv for the kind words!

Ryuketsukami pushed a commit to Ryuketsukami/NemoClaw that referenced this pull request Mar 24, 2026
)

* security: fix command injection across all CLI entry points

Comprehensive fix for shell injection vulnerabilities where user input
(instance names, sandbox names, model names, API keys) was interpolated
unsanitized into shell commands via run()/runInteractive()/execSync().

Changes:
- Add shellQuote() and validateName() to runner.js as shared utilities
- Replace all execSync() with execFileSync() in deploy (no shell)
- Apply shellQuote() to every user-controlled variable in shell commands
  across nemoclaw.js, onboard.js, nim.js, policies.js
- Add RFC 1123 name validation at CLI dispatch for sandbox/instance names
- Fix path traversal in policies.js loadPreset()
- Replace predictable temp file with mkdtempSync()
- Remove duplicate shellQuote() definitions (now single source in runner.js)
- 9 new test cases for shellQuote, validateName, and path traversal

Supersedes NVIDIA#55, NVIDIA#110, NVIDIA#475, NVIDIA#540, NVIDIA#48, NVIDIA#171.

* fix: deduplicate shellQuote in local-inference.js

Import shellQuote from runner.js instead of defining a local copy.
Single source of truth for shell quoting across the codebase.

* security: fix telegram bridge injection + add regression guards

Telegram bridge:
- Replace execSync with execFileSync for ssh-config retrieval
- shellQuote message, API key, and session ID in remote command
- Validate SANDBOX_NAME at startup
- Use mkdtempSync for temp SSH config (not predictable path)

Regression tests:
- nemoclaw.js must not use execSync
- Single shellQuote definition in bin/
- CLI rejects malicious sandbox names (e2e, no mocking)
- telegram-bridge.js validates SANDBOX_NAME and avoids execSync

* security: address CodeRabbit review findings on shell injection PR

- Shell-quote secret values written to .env before remote source
- Wrap scp upload in try/finally to guarantee temp secret cleanup
- Shell-quote CHAT_UI_URL and NVIDIA_API_KEY env args in onboard
- Replace predictable Date.now() temp path with mkdtempSync in policies
- Strengthen e2e test with canary file to prove payload never executes
- Fix merge-introduced test expectations for shellQuote single-quote format
jessesanford pushed a commit to jessesanford/NemoClaw that referenced this pull request Mar 24, 2026
)

* security: fix command injection across all CLI entry points

Comprehensive fix for shell injection vulnerabilities where user input
(instance names, sandbox names, model names, API keys) was interpolated
unsanitized into shell commands via run()/runInteractive()/execSync().

Changes:
- Add shellQuote() and validateName() to runner.js as shared utilities
- Replace all execSync() with execFileSync() in deploy (no shell)
- Apply shellQuote() to every user-controlled variable in shell commands
  across nemoclaw.js, onboard.js, nim.js, policies.js
- Add RFC 1123 name validation at CLI dispatch for sandbox/instance names
- Fix path traversal in policies.js loadPreset()
- Replace predictable temp file with mkdtempSync()
- Remove duplicate shellQuote() definitions (now single source in runner.js)
- 9 new test cases for shellQuote, validateName, and path traversal

Supersedes NVIDIA#55, NVIDIA#110, NVIDIA#475, NVIDIA#540, NVIDIA#48, NVIDIA#171.

* fix: deduplicate shellQuote in local-inference.js

Import shellQuote from runner.js instead of defining a local copy.
Single source of truth for shell quoting across the codebase.

* security: fix telegram bridge injection + add regression guards

Telegram bridge:
- Replace execSync with execFileSync for ssh-config retrieval
- shellQuote message, API key, and session ID in remote command
- Validate SANDBOX_NAME at startup
- Use mkdtempSync for temp SSH config (not predictable path)

Regression tests:
- nemoclaw.js must not use execSync
- Single shellQuote definition in bin/
- CLI rejects malicious sandbox names (e2e, no mocking)
- telegram-bridge.js validates SANDBOX_NAME and avoids execSync

* security: address CodeRabbit review findings on shell injection PR

- Shell-quote secret values written to .env before remote source
- Wrap scp upload in try/finally to guarantee temp secret cleanup
- Shell-quote CHAT_UI_URL and NVIDIA_API_KEY env args in onboard
- Replace predictable Date.now() temp path with mkdtempSync in policies
- Strengthen e2e test with canary file to prove payload never executes
- Fix merge-introduced test expectations for shellQuote single-quote format
mafueee pushed a commit to mafueee/NemoClaw that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2026
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