We take security seriously. If you discover a vulnerability in cocapn, please report it responsibly.
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
-
Preferred: Email security@superinstance.com with:
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Any suggested fix
-
Alternative: Send a direct message via our Discord to any maintainer
- We will acknowledge your report within 48 hours
- We will provide an initial assessment within 5 business days
- We will keep you informed of our progress
- We will credit you in the security fix (unless you prefer anonymity)
- We will request a 90-day disclosure deadline
Security issues we care about:
- Remote code execution
- Authentication bypass
- Data leakage (user data, API keys, memory contents)
- Privilege escalation
- Denial of service
- Theoretical concerns without proof of concept
- Issues in third-party dependencies (report to them directly)
- Social engineering vectors
- Physical access attacks
User Input → Bridge (local) → PII Filter → LLM API → Response → Brain (local) → User
| Data | Stored Locally | Sent Externally |
|---|---|---|
| Chat messages | Yes (Brain) | Yes (to LLM, PII-filtered) |
| Memory facts | Yes (Brain/wiki) | No |
| API keys | Yes (settings.json) | No (used as auth headers) |
| Plugin code | Yes (plugins dir) | No |
| Telemetry | No (opt-in, anonymous) | Yes (if enabled) |
Cocapn can run with zero external network calls:
- Set
COCAPN_OFFLINE=truein environment - All LLM calls will fail gracefully
- Memory, skills, and plugins still work
- Webhook receiver disabled
- API keys stored in plaintext in
~/.cocapn/settings.json(your local filesystem) - No encryption at rest for memory data (lives in your Git repo)
- All external communication over HTTPS
- Fleet JWT signed with HMAC-SHA256
⚠️ Cold plugins run in child processes with timeout and memory limits⚠️ Hot plugins run in the bridge process with full access- Permission system exists but is advisory (enforcement in progress)
- Only install plugins from trusted sources
- Review plugin code before installing
- Plugin sandbox permissions are not yet enforced in the execution path
- No encryption at rest for memory data
- Webhook receiver requires manual authentication setup
- No SSO/SAML support
- Auditor: Simulated security researcher (GLM-5.1)
- Findings: 4 Critical, 5 High, 4 Medium, 3 Info
- Status: All Critical and High fixed. Medium tracked.
- Report:
docs/security-audit-cycle2.md
Maintained by CedarBeach2019 (active fork of superinstance/cocapn).