edcloud is a single-operator personal lab, not a multi-tenant platform.
Core assumptions:
- Access is Tailscale-only.
- The EC2 security group has no inbound rules.
- The operator controls AWS and Tailscale identities.
- Workloads are trusted by the operator.
- Public SSH exposure
- Public exposure of Portainer or workload ports (Portainer binds to Tailscale interface only)
- IMDSv1 usage (IMDSv2 is required, hop limit set to 1)
- Avoidable idle spend (automatic idle shutdown)
- Credentials in user-data (auth keys fetched from SSM at boot)
- Compromise of your AWS or Tailscale account
- Malicious or vulnerable containers you choose to run
- Physical compromise of devices in your tailnet
- Multi-user isolation and tenant-level access control
- Docker socket exposure in Portainer (accepted risk for single-operator convenience)
- Keep runtime secrets in AWS SSM Parameter Store.
- Do not commit credentials, keys, or tokens to git.
- Use MFA on AWS and your identity provider.
- Rotate Tailscale auth keys and remove unused devices.
- Keep AWS DLM backup policy enabled and review
edc backup-policy statusperiodically. - Run restore drills and validate backup recovery.
Do not open public issues for security vulnerabilities.
Report privately to @brfid on GitHub and include:
- A clear description
- Reproduction steps
- Expected impact
- Suggested remediation (optional)
Response targets:
- Initial acknowledgment: within 7 days
- Fix priority: based on impact and exploitability
- Public disclosure: after a fix is available
Security fixes are applied on main.
Security issues in upstream dependencies (AWS, Ubuntu, Docker, Tailscale, Portainer) should also be reported to the relevant maintainers.