Update module github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 to v2.6.2 [SECURITY] (release-v0.7) #3076
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ℹ️ Artifact update noticeFile name: acceptance/go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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File name: go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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This PR contains the following updates:
v2.4.1→v2.6.2GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-22703
Impact
A Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event.
This vulnerability only affects users that provide a trusted root via
--trusted-rootor when fetched automatically from a TUF repository, when no trusted key material is provided viaSIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY. When using the default flag values in Cosign v3 to sign and verify (--use-signing-config=trueand--new-bundle-format=truefor signing,--new-bundle-format=truefor verification), users are unaffected. Cosign v2 users are affected using the default flag values.This issue had previously been fixed in GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 but recent refactoring caused a regression. We have added testing to prevent a future regression.
Steps to Reproduce
Patches
Upgrade to Cosign v2.6.2 or Cosign v3.0.4. This does not affect Cosign v1.
Workarounds
You can provide trusted key material via a set of flags under certain conditions. The simplest fix is to upgrade to the latest Cosign v2 or v3 release.
Note that the example below works for
cosign verify,cosign verify-blob,cosign verify-blob-attestation, andcosign verify-attestation`.Release Notes
sigstore/cosign (github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2)
v2.6.2Compare Source
v2.6.2 resolves GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m.
Changes
v2.6.1Compare Source
Bug Fixes
v2.6.0Compare Source
v2.6.0 introduces a number of new features, including:
Example generation and verification of a signed in-toto statement:
Example container signing and verification using the new bundle format and referring artifacts:
Example usage of a signing config provided by the public good instance's TUF repository:
v2.6.0 leverages sigstore-go's signing and verification APIs gated behind these new flags. In an upcoming major release, we will be
updating Cosign to default to producing and consuming bundles to align with all other Sigstore SDKs.
Features
attest-blobthe ability to supply a complete in-toto statement, and add toverify-blob-attestationthe ability to verify with just a digest (#4306)Breaking API Changes
sign.SignerFromKeyOptsno longer generates a key. Instead, it returns whether or not the client needs to generate a key, and if so, clientsshould call
sign.KeylessSigner. This allows clients to more easily manage key generation.Bug Fixes
v2.5.3Compare Source
Features
Bug Fixes
v2.5.2Compare Source
Bug Fixes
Documentation
v2.5.1Compare Source
Features
Bug Fixes
Docs
verify-blobcmd examples (#4160)Releases
Contributors
v2.5.0Compare Source
v2.5.0 includes an implementation of the new bundle specification,
attesting and verifying OCI image attestations uploaded as OCI artifacts.
This feature is currently gated behind the
--new-bundle-formatflagwhen running
cosign attest.Features
Fixes
Contributors
v2.4.3Compare Source
Features
Bug Fixes
Cleanup
Contributors
v2.4.2Compare Source
Features
--trusted-root(#3933)Bug Fixes
Documentation
Contributors
Configuration
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