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{jallison} add lab ra requested changes #573
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{jallison} add lab ra requested changes #573
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I force pushed |
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I need to make sure we get documented a better way of saying where our sources are
This is what I used when pulling secure boot stuff from Kernel-Ark and Debian 489faf9 or 5486b17 What i find interseting is that ARK revences CentOS-9 as the source for both with merge requests that have mroe commits.
Now making this spicer is that is Stream-10 (6.12.x)
But I would appreciate it if we kept our original formatting on pulled patches commits so probably something like
I want to make sure that when we do forward ports or rebases we know where and why things came in, in the event we move the kernel again and we lose all the PR data. |
@PlaidCat For the FIPS patches though there's been no precedent of following our commit formatting. The justification for these code changes comes from the lab so the provenance of the code doesn't matter—the lab wants it and all I did was fish out the actual commits for these changes. |
Just because there hasn't been precedence because the lab wants them doesn't mean we shouldn't try, there is nothing worse than coming back to something and not knowing where or why we got the stuff from and where we should be looking for updates / changes. Which is why I said
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@PlaidCat How should we document the provenance within our standard format? Since these commits don't come from upstream Linux. |
Please use this one from here: #573 (comment)
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feature FIPS enablement commit-author Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> commit e3a5a100a7dcd102b45f6b402f3d8b6a3ceabc1c commit-source https://gitlab.com/cki-project/kernel-ark.git JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-54183 Upstream Status: RHEL only Forwardport of 45e87c3 ("crypto: seqiv - flag instantiations as FIPS compliant") from C9S. This patch has no chances to be accepted upstream, see the commit message below. Author: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> crypto: seqiv - flag instantiations as FIPS compliant For gcm(aes) with external IV generation, FIPS 140-3 requires the verification of all external IV generation operations in order to ensure the uniqueness of the IV (see IG C.H). This is being deemed unfeasible and thus, only internal IV generation, i.e. wrapping gcm(aes) with seqiv(), can effectively be considered as approved. The standard approach would be to disallow plain gcm(aes) and to only allow seqiv(gcm(aes)) in FIPS mode. However, there are quite some plain gcm(aes) usage sites in the kernel: a quick grep reveals samba, macsec, ceph, mac80211, tipc, tls, etc. and breaking these in FIPS mode would be highly undesirable. It might perhaps be possible to convert some of these to seqiv(gcm(aes)), but for some others it might be entirely impossible due to e.g. protocol constraints. For the time being, an alternative approach has been proposed as a workaround: make seqiv() set a new flag, CRYPTO_TFM_FIPS_COMPLIANCE, on the transforms and document that in the particular case of gcm(aes), callers must check for this flag in order to determine FIPS compliance. Implement this. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit e3a5a100a7dcd102b45f6b402f3d8b6a3ceabc1c) Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com>
feature FIPS enablement commit-author Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> commit 6030c378bf503f83af9d46e58d43e164fa49eaa5 commit-source https://gitlab.com/cki-project/kernel-ark.git JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-54183 Upstream Status: RHEL only Forwardport of 8d6b650 ("crypto: dh - implement FIPS PCT") from C9S. The below patch from Nicolai is not going to be accepted upstream. Add a panic on a failed test per FIPS certification requirement. From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 16:51:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: dh - implement FIPS PCT References: jsc#SLE-21132,bsc#1191256 Patch-mainline: Never, not upstreamable SP800-56Arev3, 5.6.2.1.4 ("Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency") requires that a pair-wise consistency check needs to be conducted on a keypair. A pair-wise consistency test (PCT) is meant to ensure that a some provided public key is indeed associated with the given private one. As the kernel's DH implementation always computes the public key from the private one, this is guaranteed already as per the API. However, in the course of the certification process, there had been a lengthy discussion regarding this topic, with the result that a PCT is nonetheless mandatory. Simply implement a PCT for DH and move on. As mandated by SP800-56Arev3, 5.6.2.1.4, the PCT involves recomputing the public key and comparing it against the one under test. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit 6030c378bf503f83af9d46e58d43e164fa49eaa5) Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com>
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Commit messages updated again. Code is still unchanged from when the PR was originally created. |
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Add back CRYPTO_TFM_FIPS_COMPLIANCE flag.
Add PCT for DH key generation.