fix(SortitionModule): total stake update #2199
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WalkthroughDecouples total staked PNK bookkeeping from in-place updates: KlerosCore now calls Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
contracts/src/arbitration/SortitionModule.sol (1)
325-333: Consider a more defensive implementation for clarity.The current if/else logic relies on the invariant that
_pnkDepositand_pnkWithdrawalare mutually exclusive (only one is non-zero at a time). While this is enforced byvalidateStake, the function itself doesn't verify this assumption.A more explicit and defensive approach:
function updateTotalStake(uint256 _pnkDeposit, uint256 _pnkWithdrawal) external override onlyByCore { // Note that we don't update totalStake in setStake() function because it doesn't always change total (e.g. during rewards/penalties). if (_pnkDeposit > 0) { totalStaked += _pnkDeposit; - } else { + } + if (_pnkWithdrawal > 0) { totalStaked -= _pnkWithdrawal; } }This handles all cases correctly without relying on the caller's invariant, and also avoids the unnecessary
totalStaked -= 0when both parameters are zero.
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📒 Files selected for processing (5)
contracts/src/arbitration/KlerosCore.sol(1 hunks)contracts/src/arbitration/SortitionModule.sol(1 hunks)contracts/src/arbitration/interfaces/ISortitionModule.sol(1 hunks)contracts/src/arbitration/university/SortitionModuleUniversity.sol(1 hunks)contracts/test/foundry/KlerosCore_Staking.t.sol(1 hunks)
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🧠 Learnings (6)
📓 Common learnings
Learnt from: jaybuidl
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 1746
File: contracts/config/courts.v2.mainnet-neo.json:167-170
Timestamp: 2024-11-19T16:31:08.965Z
Learning: In `contracts/config/courts.v2.mainnet-neo.json`, the `minStake` parameter is denominated in PNK, not ETH.
📚 Learning: 2025-09-03T22:48:32.972Z
Learnt from: jaybuidl
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 0
File: :0-0
Timestamp: 2025-09-03T22:48:32.972Z
Learning: In the Kleros v2 codebase, the team prioritizes gas optimization over strict CEI pattern compliance when dealing with trusted contracts. For penalty execution logic, they prefer batching storage writes (`round.pnkPenalties`) rather than updating incrementally after each penalty calculation to save gas costs, as the risk is extremely low between trusted contracts.
Applied to files:
contracts/src/arbitration/KlerosCore.sol
📚 Learning: 2025-09-30T17:18:12.895Z
Learnt from: jaybuidl
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 2145
File: contracts/src/arbitration/dispute-kits/DisputeKitClassicBase.sol:277-286
Timestamp: 2025-09-30T17:18:12.895Z
Learning: In DisputeKitClassicBase.sol's castCommit function, jurors are allowed to re-submit commits during the commit period. The implementation uses a commitCount variable to track only first-time commits (where commit == bytes32(0)) so that totalCommitted is not incremented when a juror updates their existing commit.
Applied to files:
contracts/src/arbitration/KlerosCore.sol
📚 Learning: 2024-11-19T16:31:08.965Z
Learnt from: jaybuidl
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 1746
File: contracts/config/courts.v2.mainnet-neo.json:167-170
Timestamp: 2024-11-19T16:31:08.965Z
Learning: In the court hierarchy, child courts' `minStake` must be greater than or equal to their parent court's `minStake`.
Applied to files:
contracts/src/arbitration/KlerosCore.sol
📚 Learning: 2024-11-19T16:31:08.965Z
Learnt from: jaybuidl
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 1746
File: contracts/config/courts.v2.mainnet-neo.json:167-170
Timestamp: 2024-11-19T16:31:08.965Z
Learning: In `contracts/config/courts.v2.mainnet-neo.json`, the `minStake` parameter is denominated in PNK, not ETH.
Applied to files:
contracts/src/arbitration/interfaces/ISortitionModule.sol
📚 Learning: 2025-09-03T19:34:58.056Z
Learnt from: jaybuidl
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 2107
File: contracts/src/arbitration/university/KlerosCoreUniversity.sol:1083-1092
Timestamp: 2025-09-03T19:34:58.056Z
Learning: KlerosCoreUniversity and SortitionModuleUniversity do not have phases, unlike KlerosCoreBase and SortitionModuleBase. Therefore, validateStake in the University contracts will never return StakingResult.Delayed, only Successful or other failure states.
Applied to files:
contracts/src/arbitration/university/SortitionModuleUniversity.sol
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🔇 Additional comments (3)
contracts/src/arbitration/KlerosCore.sol (1)
1365-1367: LGTM! Correctly integrates total stake update into the staking flow.The call is properly placed after
setStakecompletes and only executes for successful, non-delayed stakes. The flow ensurestotalStakedbookkeeping is synchronized with actual PNK transfers.contracts/src/arbitration/university/SortitionModuleUniversity.sol (1)
133-136: LGTM! Appropriate no-op implementation for the University variant.The stub correctly satisfies the interface contract while maintaining access control. Based on learnings, SortitionModuleUniversity doesn't track phases or total stake, so a no-op is the correct implementation here.
contracts/src/arbitration/interfaces/ISortitionModule.sol (1)
60-63: LGTM! Clean interface declaration with appropriate documentation.The function is well-placed adjacent to
validateStakeand has clear NatSpec describing its purpose.
Comment on lines
+144
to
+168
| function test_setStake_totalStaked() public { | ||
| // Increase | ||
| vm.prank(staker1); | ||
| core.setStake(GENERAL_COURT, 4000); | ||
| vm.prank(staker1); | ||
| core.setStake(GENERAL_COURT, 5001); | ||
| vm.prank(staker2); | ||
| core.setStake(GENERAL_COURT, 1000); | ||
| vm.prank(staker2); | ||
| core.setStake(GENERAL_COURT, 1500); | ||
|
|
||
| assertEq(sortitionModule.totalStaked(), 6501, "Wrong totalStaked"); | ||
|
|
||
| // Decrease | ||
| vm.prank(staker1); | ||
| core.setStake(GENERAL_COURT, 3000); | ||
| vm.prank(staker1); | ||
| core.setStake(GENERAL_COURT, 2500); | ||
| vm.prank(staker2); | ||
| core.setStake(GENERAL_COURT, 1400); | ||
| vm.prank(staker2); | ||
| core.setStake(GENERAL_COURT, 1200); | ||
|
|
||
| assertEq(sortitionModule.totalStaked(), 3700, "Wrong totalStaked"); | ||
| } |
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fd -t f "SortitionModule\.sol" contracts/Repository: kleros/kleros-v2
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Test coverage for delayed stakes affecting totalStaked should be added.
The verification confirms the review comment's concern is valid. While the current test_setStake_totalStaked() correctly validates immediate stakes, there is a test coverage gap:
- Delayed stakes do NOT immediately update
sortitionModule.totalStaked()(they return early in_setStake()at line 1351) - When
executeDelayedStakes()is called during the Staking phase, it invokessetStakeBySortitionModule()which calls_setStake()with_noDelay=true, which then callsupdateTotalStake()to update the global total - The existing
test_executeDelayedStakes()validates delayed stake execution but never checks thatsortitionModule.totalStaked()is correctly updated after execution
A test case should verify that executing delayed stakes properly increments the global totalStaked metric.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In contracts/test/foundry/KlerosCore_Staking.t.sol around lines 144 to 168, add
a test that verifies delayed stakes do not immediately affect
sortitionModule.totalStaked and that calling executeDelayedStakes during the
Staking phase updates totalStaked appropriately: create delayed stakes (use
callers that will trigger the delayed path), assert
sortitionModule.totalStaked() remains unchanged, advance the contract to the
Staking phase (or ensure executeDelayedStakes is callable), call
core.executeDelayedStakes(), then assert sortitionModule.totalStaked() equals
the expected new total after delayed stakes are applied.
|
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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📒 Files selected for processing (1)
contracts/test/foundry/KlerosCore_Execution.t.sol(3 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🧠 Learnings (3)
📚 Learning: 2025-09-04T23:36:16.415Z
Learnt from: jaybuidl
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 2126
File: contracts/src/arbitration/KlerosCore.sol:472-489
Timestamp: 2025-09-04T23:36:16.415Z
Learning: In this repo, KlerosCore emits AcceptedFeeToken and NewCurrencyRate events that are declared in contracts/src/arbitration/interfaces/IArbitratorV2.sol; implementations don’t need to redeclare these events.
Applied to files:
contracts/test/foundry/KlerosCore_Execution.t.sol
📚 Learning: 2024-11-19T05:31:48.701Z
Learnt from: Harman-singh-waraich
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 1744
File: web/src/hooks/useGenesisBlock.ts:9-31
Timestamp: 2024-11-19T05:31:48.701Z
Learning: In `useGenesisBlock.ts`, within the `useEffect` hook, the conditions (`isKlerosUniversity`, `isKlerosNeo`, `isTestnetDeployment`) are mutually exclusive, so multiple imports won't execute simultaneously, and race conditions are not a concern.
Applied to files:
contracts/test/foundry/KlerosCore_Execution.t.sol
📚 Learning: 2025-09-30T17:18:12.895Z
Learnt from: jaybuidl
Repo: kleros/kleros-v2 PR: 2145
File: contracts/src/arbitration/dispute-kits/DisputeKitClassicBase.sol:277-286
Timestamp: 2025-09-30T17:18:12.895Z
Learning: In DisputeKitClassicBase.sol's castCommit function, jurors are allowed to re-submit commits during the commit period. The implementation uses a commitCount variable to track only first-time commits (where commit == bytes32(0)) so that totalCommitted is not incremented when a juror updates their existing commit.
Applied to files:
contracts/test/foundry/KlerosCore_Execution.t.sol
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🔇 Additional comments (3)
contracts/test/foundry/KlerosCore_Execution.t.sol (3)
11-11: LGTM! Console import for test debugging.The forge-std console import is appropriate for test files and is used effectively to log
totalStakedvalues during test execution.
916-953: LGTM! Helper functions are well-structured.The helper functions
_stakeBalanceForJuror,_stakePnk_createDispute_moveToDrawingPhase,_drawJurors_advancePeriodToVoting, and_vote_executeare well-designed test utilities that properly encapsulate common test setup patterns. They improve test readability and reduce code duplication.
753-797: This test needs assertions to validate the fix or error expectations if documenting known buggy behavior.The test ends with
_stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000)(line 796) but provides no assertions afterward. The comment indicates staker2's staking should revert with overflow, yet there is novm.expectRevert()wrapper. Either add assertions confirmingtotalStakeddoes not overflow after the fix (if this validates the fix), or wrap the staker2 call withvm.expectRevert()if intentionally documenting the pre-fix bug. Additionally, remove or clarify the "post condition: inflated totalStaked" comment to reflect whether this test expects the bug to exist or to be fixed.
Comment on lines
+753
to
+797
| function test_inflatedTotalStaked_whenDelayedStakeExecute_whenJurorHasNoFunds() public { | ||
| // pre conditions | ||
| // 1. there is a dispute in drawing phase | ||
| // 2. juror call setStake with an amount greater than his PNK balance | ||
| // 3. draw jurors, move to voting phase and execute voting | ||
| // 4. move sortition to staking phase | ||
| uint256 disputeID = 0; | ||
| uint256 amountToStake = 20000; | ||
| _stakePnk_createDispute_moveToDrawingPhase(disputeID, staker1, amountToStake); | ||
|
|
||
| KlerosCore.Round memory round = core.getRoundInfo(disputeID, 0); | ||
| uint256 pnkAtStakePerJuror = round.pnkAtStakePerJuror; | ||
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker1, type(uint256).max); | ||
| _drawJurors_advancePeriodToVoting(disputeID); | ||
| _vote_execute(disputeID, staker1); | ||
| sortitionModule.passPhase(); // set it to staking phase | ||
| _assertJurorBalance( | ||
| disputeID, | ||
| staker1, | ||
| amountToStake, | ||
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | ||
| amountToStake, | ||
| 1 | ||
| ); | ||
|
|
||
| console.log("totalStaked before: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | ||
|
|
||
| // execution: execute delayed stake | ||
| sortitionModule.executeDelayedStakes(1); | ||
|
|
||
| // post condition: inflated totalStaked | ||
| console.log("totalStaked after: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | ||
| _assertJurorBalance( | ||
| disputeID, | ||
| staker1, | ||
| amountToStake, | ||
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | ||
| amountToStake, | ||
| 1 | ||
| ); | ||
|
|
||
| // new juror tries to stake but totalStaked already reached type(uint256).max | ||
| // it reverts with "arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)" | ||
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000); | ||
| } |
Contributor
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Incomplete test: Missing assertions or revert expectation.
The test comment on line 795 states that staker2's stake attempt "reverts with arithmetic underflow or overflow," but line 796 calls _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000) without a preceding vm.expectRevert() call and without any subsequent assertions. This leaves the test's behavior and purpose unclear.
Additionally, the test relies on the _assertJurorBalance helper which currently has a critical bug (see separate comment), so the existing assertions at lines 769-776 and 785-792 are not functioning correctly.
Please clarify the test's intent and add appropriate assertions:
If the stake should revert:
console.log("totalStaked after: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked());
_assertJurorBalance(
disputeID,
staker1,
amountToStake,
pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS,
amountToStake,
1
);
// new juror tries to stake but totalStaked already reached type(uint256).max
- // it reverts with "arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)"
+ vm.expectRevert(); // or specify the exact error
_stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000);If the stake should succeed:
// new juror tries to stake but totalStaked already reached type(uint256).max
- // it reverts with "arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)"
_stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000);
+ // Add assertions about staker2's balance and totalStaked
+ assertEq(sortitionModule.totalStaked(), expectedValue, "totalStaked should be...");📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| function test_inflatedTotalStaked_whenDelayedStakeExecute_whenJurorHasNoFunds() public { | |
| // pre conditions | |
| // 1. there is a dispute in drawing phase | |
| // 2. juror call setStake with an amount greater than his PNK balance | |
| // 3. draw jurors, move to voting phase and execute voting | |
| // 4. move sortition to staking phase | |
| uint256 disputeID = 0; | |
| uint256 amountToStake = 20000; | |
| _stakePnk_createDispute_moveToDrawingPhase(disputeID, staker1, amountToStake); | |
| KlerosCore.Round memory round = core.getRoundInfo(disputeID, 0); | |
| uint256 pnkAtStakePerJuror = round.pnkAtStakePerJuror; | |
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker1, type(uint256).max); | |
| _drawJurors_advancePeriodToVoting(disputeID); | |
| _vote_execute(disputeID, staker1); | |
| sortitionModule.passPhase(); // set it to staking phase | |
| _assertJurorBalance( | |
| disputeID, | |
| staker1, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| 1 | |
| ); | |
| console.log("totalStaked before: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | |
| // execution: execute delayed stake | |
| sortitionModule.executeDelayedStakes(1); | |
| // post condition: inflated totalStaked | |
| console.log("totalStaked after: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | |
| _assertJurorBalance( | |
| disputeID, | |
| staker1, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| 1 | |
| ); | |
| // new juror tries to stake but totalStaked already reached type(uint256).max | |
| // it reverts with "arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)" | |
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000); | |
| } | |
| function test_inflatedTotalStaked_whenDelayedStakeExecute_whenJurorHasNoFunds() public { | |
| // pre conditions | |
| // 1. there is a dispute in drawing phase | |
| // 2. juror call setStake with an amount greater than his PNK balance | |
| // 3. draw jurors, move to voting phase and execute voting | |
| // 4. move sortition to staking phase | |
| uint256 disputeID = 0; | |
| uint256 amountToStake = 20000; | |
| _stakePnk_createDispute_moveToDrawingPhase(disputeID, staker1, amountToStake); | |
| KlerosCore.Round memory round = core.getRoundInfo(disputeID, 0); | |
| uint256 pnkAtStakePerJuror = round.pnkAtStakePerJuror; | |
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker1, type(uint256).max); | |
| _drawJurors_advancePeriodToVoting(disputeID); | |
| _vote_execute(disputeID, staker1); | |
| sortitionModule.passPhase(); // set it to staking phase | |
| _assertJurorBalance( | |
| disputeID, | |
| staker1, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| 1 | |
| ); | |
| console.log("totalStaked before: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | |
| // execution: execute delayed stake | |
| sortitionModule.executeDelayedStakes(1); | |
| // post condition: inflated totalStaked | |
| console.log("totalStaked after: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | |
| _assertJurorBalance( | |
| disputeID, | |
| staker1, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| 1 | |
| ); | |
| // new juror tries to stake but totalStaked already reached type(uint256).max | |
| vm.expectRevert(); | |
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000); | |
| } |
Suggested change
| function test_inflatedTotalStaked_whenDelayedStakeExecute_whenJurorHasNoFunds() public { | |
| // pre conditions | |
| // 1. there is a dispute in drawing phase | |
| // 2. juror call setStake with an amount greater than his PNK balance | |
| // 3. draw jurors, move to voting phase and execute voting | |
| // 4. move sortition to staking phase | |
| uint256 disputeID = 0; | |
| uint256 amountToStake = 20000; | |
| _stakePnk_createDispute_moveToDrawingPhase(disputeID, staker1, amountToStake); | |
| KlerosCore.Round memory round = core.getRoundInfo(disputeID, 0); | |
| uint256 pnkAtStakePerJuror = round.pnkAtStakePerJuror; | |
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker1, type(uint256).max); | |
| _drawJurors_advancePeriodToVoting(disputeID); | |
| _vote_execute(disputeID, staker1); | |
| sortitionModule.passPhase(); // set it to staking phase | |
| _assertJurorBalance( | |
| disputeID, | |
| staker1, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| 1 | |
| ); | |
| console.log("totalStaked before: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | |
| // execution: execute delayed stake | |
| sortitionModule.executeDelayedStakes(1); | |
| // post condition: inflated totalStaked | |
| console.log("totalStaked after: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | |
| _assertJurorBalance( | |
| disputeID, | |
| staker1, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| 1 | |
| ); | |
| // new juror tries to stake but totalStaked already reached type(uint256).max | |
| // it reverts with "arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)" | |
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000); | |
| } | |
| function test_inflatedTotalStaked_whenDelayedStakeExecute_whenJurorHasNoFunds() public { | |
| // pre conditions | |
| // 1. there is a dispute in drawing phase | |
| // 2. juror call setStake with an amount greater than his PNK balance | |
| // 3. draw jurors, move to voting phase and execute voting | |
| // 4. move sortition to staking phase | |
| uint256 disputeID = 0; | |
| uint256 amountToStake = 20000; | |
| _stakePnk_createDispute_moveToDrawingPhase(disputeID, staker1, amountToStake); | |
| KlerosCore.Round memory round = core.getRoundInfo(disputeID, 0); | |
| uint256 pnkAtStakePerJuror = round.pnkAtStakePerJuror; | |
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker1, type(uint256).max); | |
| _drawJurors_advancePeriodToVoting(disputeID); | |
| _vote_execute(disputeID, staker1); | |
| sortitionModule.passPhase(); // set it to staking phase | |
| _assertJurorBalance( | |
| disputeID, | |
| staker1, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| 1 | |
| ); | |
| console.log("totalStaked before: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | |
| // execution: execute delayed stake | |
| sortitionModule.executeDelayedStakes(1); | |
| // post condition: inflated totalStaked | |
| console.log("totalStaked after: %e", sortitionModule.totalStaked()); | |
| _assertJurorBalance( | |
| disputeID, | |
| staker1, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| pnkAtStakePerJuror * DEFAULT_NB_OF_JURORS, | |
| amountToStake, | |
| 1 | |
| ); | |
| _stakeBalanceForJuror(staker2, 20000); | |
| // Add assertions about staker2's balance and totalStaked | |
| assertEq(sortitionModule.totalStaked(), expectedValue, "totalStaked should be..."); | |
| } |
Comment on lines
+900
to
+914
| function _assertJurorBalance( | ||
| uint256 disputeID, | ||
| address juror, | ||
| uint256 totalStakedPnk, | ||
| uint256 totalLocked, | ||
| uint256 stakedInCourt, | ||
| uint256 nbCourts | ||
| ) internal { | ||
| (uint256 totalStakedPnk, uint256 totalLocked, uint256 stakedInCourt, uint256 nbCourts) = sortitionModule | ||
| .getJurorBalance(juror, GENERAL_COURT); | ||
| assertEq(totalStakedPnk, totalStakedPnk, "Wrong totalStakedPnk"); // jurors total staked a.k.a juror.stakedPnk | ||
| assertEq(totalLocked, totalLocked, "Wrong totalLocked"); | ||
| assertEq(stakedInCourt, stakedInCourt, "Wrong stakedInCourt"); // juror staked in court a.k.a _stakeOf | ||
| assertEq(nbCourts, nbCourts, "Wrong nbCourts"); | ||
| } |
Contributor
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Critical: Variable shadowing makes all assertions useless.
The tuple destructuring on lines 908-909 redeclares variables with the same names as the function parameters, causing variable shadowing. This means all assertions on lines 910-913 compare values against themselves and will always pass, regardless of the actual vs. expected values. The expected values passed as parameters are never used.
Apply this diff to fix the variable shadowing:
function _assertJurorBalance(
uint256 disputeID,
address juror,
- uint256 totalStakedPnk,
- uint256 totalLocked,
- uint256 stakedInCourt,
- uint256 nbCourts
+ uint256 expectedTotalStakedPnk,
+ uint256 expectedTotalLocked,
+ uint256 expectedStakedInCourt,
+ uint256 expectedNbCourts
) internal {
(uint256 totalStakedPnk, uint256 totalLocked, uint256 stakedInCourt, uint256 nbCourts) = sortitionModule
.getJurorBalance(juror, GENERAL_COURT);
- assertEq(totalStakedPnk, totalStakedPnk, "Wrong totalStakedPnk"); // jurors total staked a.k.a juror.stakedPnk
- assertEq(totalLocked, totalLocked, "Wrong totalLocked");
- assertEq(stakedInCourt, stakedInCourt, "Wrong stakedInCourt"); // juror staked in court a.k.a _stakeOf
- assertEq(nbCourts, nbCourts, "Wrong nbCourts");
+ assertEq(totalStakedPnk, expectedTotalStakedPnk, "Wrong totalStakedPnk");
+ assertEq(totalLocked, expectedTotalLocked, "Wrong totalLocked");
+ assertEq(stakedInCourt, expectedStakedInCourt, "Wrong stakedInCourt");
+ assertEq(nbCourts, expectedNbCourts, "Wrong nbCourts");
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| function _assertJurorBalance( | |
| uint256 disputeID, | |
| address juror, | |
| uint256 totalStakedPnk, | |
| uint256 totalLocked, | |
| uint256 stakedInCourt, | |
| uint256 nbCourts | |
| ) internal { | |
| (uint256 totalStakedPnk, uint256 totalLocked, uint256 stakedInCourt, uint256 nbCourts) = sortitionModule | |
| .getJurorBalance(juror, GENERAL_COURT); | |
| assertEq(totalStakedPnk, totalStakedPnk, "Wrong totalStakedPnk"); // jurors total staked a.k.a juror.stakedPnk | |
| assertEq(totalLocked, totalLocked, "Wrong totalLocked"); | |
| assertEq(stakedInCourt, stakedInCourt, "Wrong stakedInCourt"); // juror staked in court a.k.a _stakeOf | |
| assertEq(nbCourts, nbCourts, "Wrong nbCourts"); | |
| } | |
| function _assertJurorBalance( | |
| uint256 disputeID, | |
| address juror, | |
| uint256 expectedTotalStakedPnk, | |
| uint256 expectedTotalLocked, | |
| uint256 expectedStakedInCourt, | |
| uint256 expectedNbCourts | |
| ) internal { | |
| (uint256 totalStakedPnk, uint256 totalLocked, uint256 stakedInCourt, uint256 nbCourts) = sortitionModule | |
| .getJurorBalance(juror, GENERAL_COURT); | |
| assertEq(totalStakedPnk, expectedTotalStakedPnk, "Wrong totalStakedPnk"); // jurors total staked a.k.a juror.stakedPnk | |
| assertEq(totalLocked, expectedTotalLocked, "Wrong totalLocked"); | |
| assertEq(stakedInCourt, expectedStakedInCourt, "Wrong stakedInCourt"); // juror staked in court a.k.a _stakeOf | |
| assertEq(nbCourts, expectedNbCourts, "Wrong nbCourts"); | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In contracts/test/foundry/KlerosCore_Execution.t.sol around lines 900-914, the
tuple destructuring currently redeclares variables with the same names as the
function parameters causing shadowing and useless self-comparisons; change the
destructuring to capture the returned values into distinct "actual" variables
(e.g. actualTotalStakedPnk, actualTotalLocked, actualStakedInCourt,
actualNbCourts) or remove the types to assign into the existing parameter names,
then compare expected parameters to those actual variables in the assertEq calls
(assertEq(actual..., expected..., "...")). Ensure you do not redeclare names so
assertions validate the expected vs actual values.
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PR-Codex overview
This PR focuses on enhancing the
SortitionModuleandKlerosCorecontracts by implementing theupdateTotalStakefunction, which manages the total stake of PNK tokens. It also includes tests to validate the new functionality and its effects on the staking process.Detailed summary
updateTotalStakefunction inSortitionModuleandISortitionModuleto manage total stake adjustments.KlerosCoreto callupdateTotalStakewhen setting stakes.Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests
✏️ Tip: You can customize this high-level summary in your review settings.