π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix SSRF vulnerabilities via urllib#53
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL π‘ Vulnerability: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in URL handling via Python's standard `urllib`. The application accepted untrusted URLs without ensuring they correspond to a safe scheme (e.g. `http://` or `https://`). Attackers could supply schemes like `file://` to read local files on the server (e.g., `file:///etc/passwd`). π― Impact: Attackers could read local files on the system and potentially reach internal network resources depending on the server configuration. π§ Fix: Added robust case-insensitive URL scheme validation checking for `http://` and `https://` prior to issuing requests with `urllib` in `kernel/federation.py`, `kernel/treasury.py`, and `kernel/workspace.py`. Raises `FederationDeliveryError` or `RuntimeError` as appropriate. β Verification: Ran unit tests to verify standard execution and manually tested with `file:///etc/passwd` to ensure the validation immediately fails and raises an exception. Co-authored-by: mapleleaflatte03 <240846662+mapleleaflatte03@users.noreply.github.com>
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π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix SSRF vulnerabilities via urllib
π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in URL handling via Python's standard
urllib. The application accepted untrusted URLs without ensuring they correspond to a safe scheme (e.g.http://orhttps://). Attackers could supply schemes likefile://to read local files on the server (e.g.,file:///etc/passwd).π― Impact: Attackers could read local files on the system and potentially reach internal network resources depending on the server configuration.
π§ Fix: Added robust case-insensitive URL scheme validation checking for
http://andhttps://prior to issuing requests withurllibinkernel/federation.py,kernel/treasury.py, andkernel/workspace.py. RaisesFederationDeliveryErrororRuntimeErroras appropriate.β Verification: Ran unit tests to verify standard execution and manually tested with
file:///etc/passwdto ensure the validation immediately fails and raises an exception.PR created automatically by Jules for task 6544187452461386101 started by @mapleleaflatte03