Merge tag 'v6.6.94-rt56' into nilrt/master/6.6

Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-driver-dma-idxd

@@ -270,6 +270,12 @@ Description:	Shows the operation capability bits displayed in bitmap format
 		correlates to the operations allowed. It's visible only
 		on platforms that support the capability.
 
+What:		/sys/bus/dsa/devices/wq<m>.<n>/driver_name
+Date:		Sept 8, 2023
+KernelVersion:	6.7.0
+Contact:	dmaengine@vger.kernel.org
+Description:	Name of driver to be bounded to the wq.
+
 What:           /sys/bus/dsa/devices/engine<m>.<n>/group_id
 Date:           Oct 25, 2019
 KernelVersion:  5.6.0

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -514,6 +514,7 @@ Description:	information about CPUs heterogeneity.
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/indirect_target_selection
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    srso
    gather_data_sampling
    reg-file-data-sampling
+   indirect-target-selection

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Indirect Target Selection (ITS)
+===============================
+
+ITS is a vulnerability in some Intel CPUs that support Enhanced IBRS and were
+released before Alder Lake. ITS may allow an attacker to control the prediction
+of indirect branches and RETs located in the lower half of a cacheline.
+
+ITS is assigned CVE-2024-28956 with a CVSS score of 4.7 (Medium).
+
+Scope of Impact
+---------------
+- **eIBRS Guest/Host Isolation**: Indirect branches in KVM/kernel may still be
+  predicted with unintended target corresponding to a branch in the guest.
+
+- **Intra-Mode BTI**: In-kernel training such as through cBPF or other native
+  gadgets.
+
+- **Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)**: After an IBPB, indirect
+  branches may still be predicted with targets corresponding to direct branches
+  executed prior to the IBPB. This is fixed by the IPU 2025.1 microcode, which
+  should be available via distro updates. Alternatively microcode can be
+  obtained from Intel's github repository [#f1]_.
+
+Affected CPUs
+-------------
+Below is the list of ITS affected CPUs [#f2]_ [#f3]_:
+
+   ========================  ============  ====================  ===============
+   Common name               Family_Model  eIBRS                 Intra-mode BTI
+                                           Guest/Host Isolation
+   ========================  ============  ====================  ===============
+   SKYLAKE_X (step >= 6)     06_55H        Affected              Affected
+   ICELAKE_X                 06_6AH        Not affected          Affected
+   ICELAKE_D                 06_6CH        Not affected          Affected
+   ICELAKE_L                 06_7EH        Not affected          Affected
+   TIGERLAKE_L               06_8CH        Not affected          Affected
+   TIGERLAKE                 06_8DH        Not affected          Affected
+   KABYLAKE_L (step >= 12)   06_8EH        Affected              Affected
+   KABYLAKE (step >= 13)     06_9EH        Affected              Affected
+   COMETLAKE                 06_A5H        Affected              Affected
+   COMETLAKE_L               06_A6H        Affected              Affected
+   ROCKETLAKE                06_A7H        Not affected          Affected
+   ========================  ============  ====================  ===============
+
+- All affected CPUs enumerate Enhanced IBRS feature.
+- IBPB isolation is affected on all ITS affected CPUs, and need a microcode
+  update for mitigation.
+- None of the affected CPUs enumerate BHI_CTRL which was introduced in Golden
+  Cove (Alder Lake and Sapphire Rapids). This can help guests to determine the
+  host's affected status.
+- Intel Atom CPUs are not affected by ITS.
+
+Mitigation
+----------
+As only the indirect branches and RETs that have their last byte of instruction
+in the lower half of the cacheline are vulnerable to ITS, the basic idea behind
+the mitigation is to not allow indirect branches in the lower half.
+
+This is achieved by relying on existing retpoline support in the kernel, and in
+compilers. ITS-vulnerable retpoline sites are runtime patched to point to newly
+added ITS-safe thunks. These safe thunks consists of indirect branch in the
+second half of the cacheline. Not all retpoline sites are patched to thunks, if
+a retpoline site is evaluated to be ITS-safe, it is replaced with an inline
+indirect branch.
+
+Dynamic thunks
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+From a dynamically allocated pool of safe-thunks, each vulnerable site is
+replaced with a new thunk, such that they get a unique address. This could
+improve the branch prediction accuracy. Also, it is a defense-in-depth measure
+against aliasing.
+
+Note, for simplicity, indirect branches in eBPF programs are always replaced
+with a jump to a static thunk in __x86_indirect_its_thunk_array. If required,
+in future this can be changed to use dynamic thunks.
+
+All vulnerable RETs are replaced with a static thunk, they do not use dynamic
+thunks. This is because RETs get their prediction from RSB mostly that does not
+depend on source address. RETs that underflow RSB may benefit from dynamic
+thunks. But, RETs significantly outnumber indirect branches, and any benefit
+from a unique source address could be outweighed by the increased icache
+footprint and iTLB pressure.
+
+Retpoline
+~~~~~~~~~
+Retpoline sequence also mitigates ITS-unsafe indirect branches. For this
+reason, when retpoline is enabled, ITS mitigation only relocates the RETs to
+safe thunks. Unless user requested the RSB-stuffing mitigation.
+
+RSB Stuffing
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+RSB-stuffing via Call Depth Tracking is a mitigation for Retbleed RSB-underflow
+attacks. And it also mitigates RETs that are vulnerable to ITS.
+
+Mitigation in guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+All guests deploy ITS mitigation by default, irrespective of eIBRS enumeration
+and Family/Model of the guest. This is because eIBRS feature could be hidden
+from a guest. One exception to this is when a guest enumerates BHI_DIS_S, which
+indicates that the guest is running on an unaffected host.
+
+To prevent guests from unnecessarily deploying the mitigation on unaffected
+platforms, Intel has defined ITS_NO bit(62) in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. When
+a guest sees this bit set, it should not enumerate the ITS bug. Note, this bit
+is not set by any hardware, but is **intended for VMMs to synthesize** it for
+guests as per the host's affected status.
+
+Mitigation options
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+The ITS mitigation can be controlled using the "indirect_target_selection"
+kernel parameter. The available options are:
+
+   ======== ===================================================================
+   on       (default)  Deploy the "Aligned branch/return thunks" mitigation.
+	    If spectre_v2 mitigation enables retpoline, aligned-thunks are only
+	    deployed for the affected RET instructions. Retpoline mitigates
+	    indirect branches.
+
+   off      Disable ITS mitigation.
+
+   vmexit   Equivalent to "=on" if the CPU is affected by guest/host isolation
+	    part of ITS. Otherwise, mitigation is not deployed. This option is
+	    useful when host userspace is not in the threat model, and only
+	    attacks from guest to host are considered.
+
+   stuff    Deploy RSB-fill mitigation when retpoline is also deployed.
+	    Otherwise, deploy the default mitigation. When retpoline mitigation
+	    is enabled, RSB-stuffing via Call-Depth-Tracking also mitigates
+	    ITS.
+
+   force    Force the ITS bug and deploy the default mitigation.
+   ======== ===================================================================
+
+Sysfs reporting
+---------------
+
+The sysfs file showing ITS mitigation status is:
+
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/indirect_target_selection
+
+Note, microcode mitigation status is not reported in this file.
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+   * - Not affected
+     - The processor is not vulnerable.
+   * - Vulnerable
+     - System is vulnerable and no mitigation has been applied.
+   * - Vulnerable, KVM: Not affected
+     - System is vulnerable to intra-mode BTI, but not affected by eIBRS
+       guest/host isolation.
+   * - Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks
+     - The mitigation is enabled, affected indirect branches and RETs are
+       relocated to safe thunks.
+   * - Mitigation: Retpolines, Stuffing RSB
+     - The mitigation is enabled using retpoline and RSB stuffing.
+
+References
+----------
+.. [#f1] Microcode repository - https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files
+
+.. [#f2] Affected Processors list - https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
+
+.. [#f3] Affected Processors list (machine readable) - https://github.com/intel/Intel-affected-processor-list

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2060,6 +2060,23 @@
 			different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
 			to achieve best performance for particular HW.
 
+	indirect_target_selection= [X86,Intel] Mitigation control for Indirect
+			Target Selection(ITS) bug in Intel CPUs. Updated
+			microcode is also required for a fix in IBPB.
+
+			on:     Enable mitigation (default).
+			off:    Disable mitigation.
+			force:	Force the ITS bug and deploy default
+				mitigation.
+			vmexit: Only deploy mitigation if CPU is affected by
+				guest/host isolation part of ITS.
+			stuff:	Deploy RSB-fill mitigation when retpoline is
+				also deployed. Otherwise, deploy the default
+				mitigation.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst
+
 	init=		[KNL]
 			Format: <full_path>
 			Run specified binary instead of /sbin/init as init
@@ -3331,6 +3348,7 @@
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64]
 					       gather_data_sampling=off [X86]
+					       indirect_target_selection=off [X86]
 					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
@@ -5960,6 +5978,8 @@
 
 			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
 			against user space to user space task attacks.
+			Selecting specific mitigation does not force enable
+			user mitigations.
 
 			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
 			the user space protections.

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/qcom,coresight-tpda.yaml

@@ -55,8 +55,7 @@ properties:
       - const: arm,primecell
 
   reg:
-    minItems: 1
-    maxItems: 2
+    maxItems: 1
 
   clocks:
     maxItems: 1

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/qcom,coresight-tpdm.yaml

@@ -41,8 +41,7 @@ properties:
       - const: arm,primecell
 
   reg:
-    minItems: 1
-    maxItems: 2
+    maxItems: 1
 
   clocks:
     maxItems: 1

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/st,st-mipid02.yaml

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ properties:
                 description:
                   Any lane can be inverted or not.
                 minItems: 1
-                maxItems: 2
+                maxItems: 3
 
             required:
               - data-lanes

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/phy/fsl,imx8mq-usb-phy.yaml

@@ -58,8 +58,7 @@ properties:
   fsl,phy-tx-vboost-level-microvolt:
     description:
       Adjust the boosted transmit launch pk-pk differential amplitude
-    minimum: 880
-    maximum: 1120
+    enum: [844, 1008, 1156]
 
   fsl,phy-comp-dis-tune-percent:
     description:

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/mediatek,mt6357-regulator.yaml

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ patternProperties:
 
   "^ldo-v(camio18|aud28|aux18|io18|io28|rf12|rf18|cn18|cn28|fe28)$":
     type: object
-    $ref: fixed-regulator.yaml#
+    $ref: regulator.yaml#
     unevaluatedProperties: false
     description:
       Properties for single fixed LDO regulator.
@@ -112,7 +112,6 @@ examples:
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <220>;
         };
         mt6357_vfe28_reg: ldo-vfe28 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vfe28";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <2800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <2800000>;
@@ -125,14 +124,12 @@ examples:
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <110>;
         };
         mt6357_vrf18_reg: ldo-vrf18 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vrf18";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <110>;
         };
         mt6357_vrf12_reg: ldo-vrf12 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vrf12";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <1200000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <1200000>;
@@ -157,14 +154,12 @@ examples:
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <264>;
         };
         mt6357_vcn28_reg: ldo-vcn28 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vcn28";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <2800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <2800000>;
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <264>;
         };
         mt6357_vcn18_reg: ldo-vcn18 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vcn18";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
@@ -183,7 +178,6 @@ examples:
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <264>;
         };
         mt6357_vcamio_reg: ldo-vcamio18 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vcamio";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
@@ -212,28 +206,24 @@ examples:
           regulator-always-on;
         };
         mt6357_vaux18_reg: ldo-vaux18 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vaux18";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <264>;
         };
         mt6357_vaud28_reg: ldo-vaud28 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vaud28";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <2800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <2800000>;
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <264>;
         };
         mt6357_vio28_reg: ldo-vio28 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vio28";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <2800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <2800000>;
           regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <264>;
         };
         mt6357_vio18_reg: ldo-vio18 {
-          compatible = "regulator-fixed";
           regulator-name = "vio18";
           regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
           regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/cypress,hx3.yaml

@@ -14,9 +14,22 @@ allOf:
 
 properties:
   compatible:
-    enum:
-      - usb4b4,6504
-      - usb4b4,6506
+    oneOf:
+      - enum:
+          - usb4b4,6504
+          - usb4b4,6506
+      - items:
+          - enum:
+              - usb4b4,6500
+              - usb4b4,6508
+          - const: usb4b4,6504
+      - items:
+          - enum:
+              - usb4b4,6502
+              - usb4b4,6503
+              - usb4b4,6507
+              - usb4b4,650a
+          - const: usb4b4,6506
 
   reg: true
 

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/vendor-prefixes.yaml

@@ -773,6 +773,8 @@ patternProperties:
     description: Linux-specific binding
   "^linx,.*":
     description: Linx Technologies
+  "^liontron,.*":
+    description: Shenzhen Liontron Technology Co., Ltd
   "^liteon,.*":
     description: LITE-ON Technology Corp.
   "^litex,.*":

Documentation/driver-api/serial/driver.rst

@@ -103,4 +103,4 @@ Some helpers are provided in order to set/get modem control lines via GPIO.
 .. kernel-doc:: drivers/tty/serial/serial_mctrl_gpio.c
    :identifiers: mctrl_gpio_init mctrl_gpio_free mctrl_gpio_to_gpiod
            mctrl_gpio_set mctrl_gpio_get mctrl_gpio_enable_ms
-           mctrl_gpio_disable_ms
+           mctrl_gpio_disable_ms_sync mctrl_gpio_disable_ms_no_sync