Simulating a full enterprise vulnerability management lifecycle — from policy creation and stakeholder alignment to credentialed scanning, prioritized remediation, and program maintenance.
| Status | ✅ Completed |
| Inception State | No existing vulnerability management policy or practices in place |
| Completion State | Formal policy enacted, stakeholder buy-in secured, and a full cycle of organization-wide vulnerability remediation successfully completed |
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Tenable | Enterprise vulnerability management platform |
| Azure Virtual Machines | Nessus scan engine and scan targets |
| PowerShell | Remediation scripting and automation |
- Tenable (enterprise vulnerability management platform)
- Azure Virtual Machines (Nessus scan engine + scan targets)
- PowerShell & BASH (remediation scripts)
- Vulnerability Management Policy Draft Creation
- Mock Meeting: Policy Buy-In (Stakeholders)
- Policy Finalization and Senior Leadership Sign-Off
- Mock Meeting: Initial Scan Permission (Server Team)
- Initial Scan of Server Team Assets
- Vulnerability Assessment and Prioritization
- Distributing Remediations to Remediation Teams
- Mock Meeting: Post-Initial Discovery Scan (Server Team)
- Mock CAB Meeting: Implementing Remediations
- Remediation Round 1: Outdated Wireshark Removal
- Remediation Round 2: Insecure Protocols & Cipher Suites
- Remediation Round 3: Guest Account Group Membership
- Remediation Round 4: Windows OS Updates & Certificate Padding Check (CVE-2013-3900)
- First Cycle Remediation Effort Summary
- On-going Vulnerability Management (Maintenance Mode)
This phase focuses on drafting a Vulnerability Management Policy as a starting point for stakeholder engagement. The initial draft outlines scope, responsibilities, and remediation timelines, and may be adjusted based on feedback from relevant departments to ensure practical implementation before final approval by upper management.
Draft Policy
In this phase, a meeting with the server team introduces the draft Vulnerability Management Policy and assesses their capability to meet remediation timelines. Feedback leads to adjustments, like extending the critical remediation window from 48 hours to one week, ensuring collaborative implementation.
💬 Click to view Meeting Notes — Policy Buy-In (Stakeholders)
Meeting: Vulnerability Management Policy — Stakeholder Buy-In
Attendees: Nikhil (IT Security Team), Jimmy (Server Team Lead)
Format: Informal sync
Nikhil: Hey, good morning Jimmy! How's everything been recently? I know everyone's been pretty busy these last few weeks.
Jimmy: Good morning Nikhil. Yeah, it's been a bit hectic but we're hanging in there — thanks for asking. I did have a chance to read through the policy draft, and overall it makes sense. However, with our current staffing levels, I don't think we can realistically meet some of those remediation timelines — especially the 48-hour window for critical vulnerabilities.
Nikhil: Yeah, I totally understand — it is a bit aggressive, especially as a starting point. How about we extend the critical window to one week as a compromise for now? We can reserve the 48-hour SLA specifically for truly severe cases, like active zero-day vulnerabilities that pose an immediate threat.
Jimmy: That sounds a lot more reasonable. We really appreciate the flexibility on that. One more thing — could we also have a bit of leeway in the beginning as the team gets used to the remediation and patching process? Just for the first few months or so while we find our footing.
Nikhil: Absolutely. Once the policy is finalized we'll officially kick off the program, but we're planning to give all departments roughly 6 months to adjust and get comfortable with the new process before we start enforcing strict timelines. Does that sound fair?
Jimmy: That works great for us. Thanks Nikhil — and I really appreciate you including us in the decision-making process. It makes a big difference to feel like we're part of the solution rather than just being handed a policy.
Nikhil: Of course — we're all in this together. Thanks for working with us on this, Jimmy.
Jimmy: No problem. Thanks for keeping it a short meeting!
Nikhil: Ha — those are always my favorite kind. Take care, bye!
Key Outcomes:
- Critical remediation window extended from 48 hours to 7 days
- 48-hour window reserved for active zero-day vulnerabilities only
- All departments granted a 6-month adjustment period post-policy finalization
- Server team confirmed buy-in and willingness to participate in the program
After gathering feedback from the server team, the policy is revised, addressing aggressive remediation timelines. With final approval from upper management, the policy now guides the program, ensuring compliance and reference for pushback resolution.
Finalized Policy
The team collaborates with the server team to initiate scheduled credential scans. A compromise is reached to scan a single server first, monitoring resource impact, and using just-in-time Active Directory credentials for secure, controlled access.
💬 Click to view Meeting Notes — Initial Scan Permission (Server Team)
Meeting: Initial Scan Permission Request — Server Team
Attendees: Nikhil (IT Security Team), Jimmy (Server Team Lead)
Format: Informal sync
Nikhil: Morning Jimmy!
Jimmy: Good morning! I heard you're ready to start running some scans?
Nikhil: That's right — now that the vulnerability management policy is finalized and signed off, I want to get started on scheduling credentialed scans of your environment.
Jimmy: Sounds good in principle — what's actually involved and how can we help?
Nikhil: We're planning to run weekly authenticated scans of the server infrastructure. With roughly 200 assets in scope, we estimate each scan will take about 4 to 6 hours to complete. To get accurate results, we'll need administrative credentials so the scan engine can remotely log into the targets and properly assess them.
Jimmy: Whoa, hold on — admin credentials to all 200 machines? That doesn't sound safe. And what exactly does the scan engine do? I'm concerned about the impact on resource utilization while the servers are under load.
Nikhil: Those are completely valid concerns — let me clarify. The scan engine sends targeted traffic to each server to check for the presence of known vulnerabilities. That includes things like inspecting the registry, checking for outdated third-party software, identifying insecure protocols, and flagging weak cipher suites. The reason credentials are required is so the engine can perform a deep authenticated assessment rather than just a surface-level network check — you get far more accurate and complete results that way.
Jimmy: Okay, that makes sense. As long as it doesn't risk taking any servers offline, I think we can work with that.
Nikhil: Absolutely — it shouldn't. To be safe though, how about we start by scanning just a single server first? We can closely monitor resource utilization during that initial scan and make sure everything looks stable before we expand to the full environment.
Jimmy: Not a bad idea at all — let's do that.
Nikhil: Great. One more thing on the credentials — rather than handing over permanent admin access, could you set up a dedicated account in Active Directory for us? Keep it disabled by default, then we enable it right before a scheduled scan and disable it again once it's done. Essentially a just-in-time access model — limits the exposure window significantly.
Jimmy: That works well for us actually. I'll have Susan get started on setting up the automation for the account provisioning.
Nikhil: Perfect. I'll wait to hear back once the credentials are ready and then we'll schedule the first scan.
Jimmy: Sounds good — I'll be in touch soon. Talk later!
Nikhil: See you, Jimmy!
Key Outcomes:
- Weekly credentialed scans approved for the server infrastructure (~200 assets, estimated 4–6 hours per scan)
- Initial scan scoped to a single server to monitor resource impact before full rollout
- Just-in-time Active Directory credentials to be provisioned — account enabled only during scan windows, disabled immediately after
- Server team (Susan) assigned to automate credential provisioning process
In this phase, an insecure Windows Server is provisioned to simulate the server team's environment. After creating vulnerabilities, an authenticated scan is performed, and the results are exported for future remediation steps.
Following the initial scan, all discovered vulnerabilities were reviewed and categorized. A remediation prioritization strategy was established based on two key factors: ease of remediation and potential impact to the environment. Quick wins with high impact were addressed first to reduce overall risk exposure as efficiently as possible.
| Priority | Category | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Third-Party Software Removal (Wireshark) | Outdated software with known CVEs; straightforward uninstall with immediate risk reduction |
| 2 | Windows OS Secure Configuration — Protocols & Ciphers | Deprecated protocols (e.g. SSLv3, TLS 1.0) and weak cipher suites expose the system to interception attacks |
| 3 | Windows OS Secure Configuration — Guest Account Group Membership | Guest account with elevated privileges represents a significant access control vulnerability |
| 4 | Windows OS Updates + Certificate Padding Check (CVE-2013-3900) | Missing patches addressed system-wide; WinTrustVerify fix applied separately via registry as Windows Update alone does not enable this remediation automatically |
Note: Prioritization was intentionally sequenced to deliver the highest risk reduction per effort early in the cycle. In a production environment, asset criticality and business impact would serve as additional prioritization factors.
The server team received remediation scripts and scan reports to address key vulnerabilities. This streamlined their efforts and prepared them for a follow-up review.
The server team reviewed vulnerability scan results, identifying outdated software, insecure accounts, and deprecated protocols. The WinTrustVerify finding was flagged as requiring a dedicated registry fix beyond Windows Updates alone. Remediation packages were prepared for submission to the Change Control Board (CAB).
💬 Click to view Meeting Notes — Post-Initial Discovery Scan (Server Team)
Meeting: Post-Initial Discovery Scan Review — Server Team
Attendees: Nikhil (IT Security Team), Jimmy (Server Team Lead)
Format: Screen-share review session
Nikhil: Morning Jimmy, how are you doing?
Jimmy: Not bad for a Monday — yourself?
Nikhil: Still alive, can't complain! Before we get into the findings though — how did the scan actually go on your end? Any outages, overutilization, anything like that?
Jimmy: The scan went well actually. We were monitoring throughout and aside from seeing the open connections in the logs, we would have never even known a scan was taking place.
Nikhil: That's great to hear — I kind of expected as much. We'll keep monitoring going forward but I don't anticipate any resource issues. Do you mind if I share my screen and walk you through the vulnerability findings?
Jimmy: Yeah, absolutely — go ahead.
Nikhil: Okay so pulling up the scan report here — the bulk of the findings are coming from Wireshark being installed. You can see all these CVEs tied to it, it's just heavily out of date so it's generating a lot of noise on its own. That one's a straightforward removal.
Jimmy: Got it, yeah that shouldn't be an issue — Wireshark shouldn't even be on production servers.
Nikhil: Exactly. Now this one's interesting — the local guest account on the server actually belongs to the local Administrators group. I'm not sure how that ended up that way but it's a significant access control issue we'll need to address.
Jimmy: Yeah that definitely shouldn't be the case. I'll need to speak with our sys admins about how that got configured.
Nikhil: Good idea. Now over here we've got deprecated cipher suites and TLS 1.0 and 1.1 still enabled — these are legacy protocols that need to be disabled. We have PowerShell scripts ready for both of those. One more thing — this WinVerifyTrust finding here, CVE-2013-3900. This one's a bit nuanced — Windows Update will patch the underlying vulnerability but it does not automatically enable the fix. It requires a separate registry key to be set manually. We've already prepared a dedicated script for that so it'll be handled as part of the Windows Updates remediation round.
Jimmy: Ah interesting — good catch on that one, I wouldn't have known the update alone wasn't enough.
Nikhil: Yeah it's easy to miss. Microsoft made it opt-in which is why it needs the extra step. So to summarize what we're looking at: Wireshark removal, disabling insecure protocols and cipher suites, removing the guest account from Administrators, and then Windows Updates combined with the WinVerifyTrust registry fix. The self-signed certificate finding we can set aside — that's just the machine's own cert and isn't an actionable risk.
Jimmy: That sounds manageable. Good news is I suspect most of our servers are going to have the same set of vulnerabilities — hopefully that makes the remediation more straightforward across the board.
Nikhil: That's actually great news — a uniform vulnerability profile means we can deploy the same remediation scripts across all servers rather than doing custom fixes per machine. Do you foresee any issues with the cipher suite and protocol changes specifically?
Jimmy: Highly doubt it — those deprecated protocols shouldn't be in use by anything we're running. We'll push it through the next Change Control Board. The Wireshark removal and guest account fix are straightforward, those are just cleanups.
Nikhil: Perfect. I'll go ahead and get started on packaging up the remediation scripts to make things as easy as possible when it comes time to deploy. One question — do you have patch management in place for the Windows Updates side of things?
Jimmy: Yes, we have automated patch management — Windows Updates should be handled automatically by next week.
Nikhil: Excellent. I'll have everything ready before the next CAB meeting and will reach out before then. Talk soon!
Jimmy: Sounds good — talk soon!
Key Outcomes:
- Scan confirmed no resource impact — cleared for full environment rollout
- Wireshark identified as primary source of CVEs — scheduled for removal
- Guest account found in local Administrators group — flagged for immediate remediation; sys admins to be consulted
- Deprecated protocols (TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) and weak cipher suites confirmed for remediation via PowerShell scripts
- CVE-2013-3900 (WinVerifyTrust) flagged as requiring a dedicated registry fix — Windows Update alone is insufficient; dedicated script prepared
- Self-signed certificate finding acknowledged as non-actionable
- Server team confirmed automated patch management is in place for Windows Updates
- Remediation packages to be submitted to Change Control Board (CAB) prior to deployment
The Change Control Board (CAB) reviewed and approved the remediation plan covering insecure protocols, cipher suites, and the WinVerifyTrust certificate padding fix. The plan included automated rollback scripts and a tiered deployment approach to minimize production risk.
💬 Click to view Meeting Notes — CAB Meeting: Implementing Remediations
Meeting: Change Control Board (CAB) — Vulnerability Remediation Review
Attendees: Johnny (CAB Facilitator), Jimmy (Server Team Manager), Nikhil (IT Security Analyst), Jack (Lead Systems Engineer)
Format: Formal CAB review session
Johnny: Okay, next up on the agenda are vulnerability remediations for the server team. We have two primary items: number one, removal of insecure protocols, and number two, removal of insecure cipher suites. I understand Nikhil from the risk department is working in conjunction with Jimmy from infrastructure on this. Jimmy, do you want to walk us through the technical aspects of the changes being implemented?
Jimmy: Normally I would, but would you mind giving this one to Nikhil? He actually built the solution for us — we're still getting familiar with the process on our end.
Johnny: Of course — Nikhil, go ahead.
Nikhil: Thanks. So to give some context — insecure cipher suites and deprecated protocols being present on a system means the system is still capable of negotiating and using cryptographic algorithms that are no longer considered secure. If one of our servers connects to a remote system that only supports those deprecated protocols, there's a real risk it could fall back and use them — which opens the door to downgrade attacks and interception. These settings are all controlled through the Windows registry, which actually makes the fix quite clean. We wrote PowerShell scripts that disable all the insecure protocols — SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 — and enforce only modern, standardized cipher suites that meet current security baselines. It's a targeted registry change with no service interruptions expected.
Jack: That sounds straightforward enough. But what if something does go wrong — do we have a rollback plan in place?
Nikhil: Absolutely, and it's built into the same script. First, we're doing a tiered deployment — we'll start with a small pilot group, validate everything looks clean, move to pre-production, and only then push to full production. On top of that, the scripts are designed with a toggle variable — setting it to $false restores the original protocol and cipher configuration immediately. So rollback is a single script run, no manual registry work needed.
Jack: Good — and since these are registry-level changes rather than application installs, the blast radius is pretty contained. I'm not too concerned.
Johnny: I'd also like to note for the record — Nikhil, you mentioned in the pre-meeting notes there's an additional item tied to the Windows Updates round, the WinVerifyTrust fix. Can you briefly touch on that?
Nikhil: Sure — CVE-2013-3900 is a WinVerifyTrust signature validation vulnerability. Windows Update patches the underlying issue but Microsoft made the actual mitigation opt-in, meaning the registry key that enforces the fix does not get set automatically by the update. We have a dedicated script that sets the EnableCertPaddingCheck registry key on both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths. It'll be deployed alongside the Windows Updates round since that's when it'll be validated in the follow-up scan.
Jack: Good catch — that's the kind of thing that would slip through if you're only relying on patch Tuesday.
Johnny: Agreed. Any further questions from anyone?
[No further questions raised]
Johnny: Great — that wraps up this week's CAB meeting. Changes are approved. We'll reconvene to review scan results post-remediation. See you all next week!
Jimmy: Thanks everyone, talk soon.
Nikhil: Thanks, see you all later!
Jack: Take care.
Key Outcomes:
- CAB approved remediation of insecure protocols (SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) and weak cipher suites via PowerShell scripts
- Tiered deployment strategy approved: Pilot → Pre-Production → Production
- Automated rollback confirmed — scripts support full reversion by toggling
$makeSecure = $false - CVE-2013-3900 (WinVerifyTrust) registry fix noted and approved — to be deployed alongside Windows Updates round
- All changes classified as low-risk registry updates — no service downtime anticipated
- Follow-up vulnerability scan scheduled post-remediation to validate all findings resolved
The server team executed a PowerShell script to silently uninstall the outdated Wireshark installation. Wireshark was the primary source of CVEs in the initial scan due to its severely outdated version. A follow-up authenticated scan confirmed all associated findings were fully resolved.
PowerShell: Wireshark Removal Script
Scan 2 - Post Wireshark Removal
PowerShell scripts were executed to disable deprecated protocols (SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) and enforce a hardened cipher suite configuration aligned with current security standards. These settings are controlled via the Windows registry and required no service interruptions. A follow-up scan confirmed all related findings were remediated.
PowerShell: Insecure Protocols Remediation PowerShell: Insecure Cipher Suites Remediation
Scan 3 - Post Protocols & Cipher Suites Remediation
The guest account was identified as an unexpected member of the local Administrators group — a significant access control misconfiguration. A PowerShell script was executed to remove the guest account from the Administrators group. A follow-up scan confirmed the finding was fully resolved.
PowerShell: Guest Account Group Membership Remediation
Scan 4 - Post Guest Account Remediation
Windows Update was re-enabled and all outstanding patches were applied until the system reached a fully patched state. In addition, CVE-2013-3900 (WinVerifyTrust Signature Validation Vulnerability) was addressed via a dedicated PowerShell script that sets the EnableCertPaddingCheck registry key on both 32-bit and 64-bit paths — a step that Windows Update does not perform automatically, making the separate script essential for full remediation. A final scan confirmed all remaining findings were resolved.
PowerShell: Certificate Padding Check — CVE-2013-3900
Scan 5 - Post Windows Updates & CVE-2013-3900 Remediation
The remediation effort successfully reduced total vulnerabilities by 85%, from 34 down to 5. Critical vulnerabilities were fully eliminated by the second scan (100% resolution) — confirming Wireshark removal as the highest-impact remediation. High vulnerabilities dropped from 9 to 0 (100% resolution) by the final scan. Medium vulnerabilities were reduced by 76%, from 17 down to 4, and Low vulnerabilities were reduced from 2 to 1. Each remediation round was validated with a follow-up authenticated scan, providing clear documented evidence of progress at every stage. In a production environment, asset criticality and business impact would serve as additional factors to guide prioritization of any remaining findings.
After completing the initial remediation cycle, the vulnerability management program transitions into Maintenance Mode. This phase shifts the focus from reactive remediation to proactive, continuous risk management — ensuring that as systems evolve and new threats emerge, the organization's security posture keeps pace. The scanning cadence, remediation timelines, and escalation procedures followed in this phase are governed by the Finalized Vulnerability Management Policy.
Key activities in Maintenance Mode include:
- Scheduled Vulnerability Scans: Perform regular authenticated scans (weekly or monthly depending on asset criticality) to detect new vulnerabilities as systems change, software is updated, or new assets are introduced into the environment
- Patch Management: Continuously evaluate and apply security patches and updates on a defined cadence; ensure no critical or high vulnerabilities remain unpatched beyond their SLA window
- Remediation Follow-ups: Address newly identified vulnerabilities promptly using the same prioritization framework established during the initial cycle — severity, exploitability, and asset criticality
- Exception Management: Formally document any vulnerabilities that cannot be remediated within SLA, with a risk acceptance justification reviewed and approved by the CISO
- Policy Review and Updates: Review the Vulnerability Management Policy at least annually — or sooner following major environmental changes, incidents, or shifts in regulatory requirements — to ensure continued alignment with security best practices
- Audit and Compliance: Conduct periodic internal audits to verify adherence to scanning schedules, remediation SLAs, and documentation requirements; maintain evidence for external audits and regulatory reviews
- Ongoing Stakeholder Communication: Maintain transparent, regular communication with remediation teams and department heads; share monthly scan summaries and quarterly trend reports with senior leadership to demonstrate program value
Maintaining an active, well-documented vulnerability management process is not a one-time effort — it is an ongoing commitment that enables organizations to stay ahead of emerging threats, satisfy compliance requirements, and build long-term security resilience.