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docs: AI-HPP v4.1.1 — threat model, architecture, and red-team clarifications#65

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tryblackjack merged 1 commit intomainfrom
codex/update-ai-hpp-standard-to-v4.1.1
Apr 8, 2026
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docs: AI-HPP v4.1.1 — threat model, architecture, and red-team clarifications#65
tryblackjack merged 1 commit intomainfrom
codex/update-ai-hpp-standard-to-v4.1.1

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Motivation

  • Normalize terminology and tighten cryptographic/lineage language across the specification to reduce ambiguity in governance verification.
  • Expand the threat model to cover signing identity/key drift risks and provide forensic Evidence Vault fields to support cross-epoch validation.
  • Clarify architecture wording around the MDP safe graph and make the normative/advisory boundary explicit for certification scope.
  • Record the red-team attack model capabilities to document test assumptions and validation coverage for the new threat class.

Description

  • Updated annex/A-THREAT-MODEL.md to use policy-lineage hash-chain verification and added T-4.1-004 Key Drift / Signing Identity Compromise with attack mechanics, detection signals, mitigations, and Evidence Vault fields (key_id, rotation_epoch, revocation_flag, lineage_root_hash).
  • Edited AI_HPP_ARCHITECTURE_V4.md to emphasize the MDP safe graph terminology and add 4.5 Normative Requirements Boundary (v4.1.1) clarifying which sections are normative vs advisory.
  • Extended RED_TEAM_AUDIT_REPORT.md with Attack Model Capability (v4.1.1) describing surface coverage, model/agentic capabilities, multi-agent test rig, and cryptographic bypass assumptions that validate mitigations including the new T-4.1-004 entry.
  • Changes are documentation-only, semantic, and non-breaking; the commit was recorded as 0e9e148 and the PR created with the described summary.

Testing

  • Ran git diff --check to verify no patch/whitespace issues and it passed successfully.
  • Reviewed diffs with git diff -- AI_HPP_ARCHITECTURE_V4.md RED_TEAM_AUDIT_REPORT.md annex/A-THREAT-MODEL.md to confirm intended edits were applied.
  • Verified repository status with git status --short and committed the changes with git commit, which completed successfully and produced commit 0e9e148.
  • No runtime or unit tests were required because the modifications are documentation-only and non-functional.

Codex Task

@tryblackjack tryblackjack merged commit 9f74072 into main Apr 8, 2026
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- Override capability for ZTAH/CCB layers.

This attack model is sufficient to validate mitigations for:
- T-3.4-001.
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P2 Badge Fix threat ID in mitigation coverage list

The coverage list references T-3.4-001, but that threat ID does not exist in the repository (the corresponding multi-agent entry is T-4.1-001 in annex/A-THREAT-MODEL.md). This breaks traceability for auditors or tooling that map red-team results to threat definitions, because the reported validation cannot be resolved to a defined threat item.

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- Access to lineage roots.
- Override capability for ZTAH/CCB layers.

This attack model is sufficient to validate mitigations for:
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P2 Badge Narrow validation claim for key-compromise threat

This section claims the attack model is sufficient to validate T-4.1-004, but the same section states the adversary had no access to signing keys or privileged bypass, while T-4.1-004 explicitly includes key extraction/identity-compromise mechanics in annex/A-THREAT-MODEL.md. As written, the report overstates test coverage for that threat class and can mislead readers about what was actually validated.

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