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security: [T1-07] reject oracle_id > 255 to prevent truncation (DGB-SEC-004)#376

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JaredTate merged 8 commits intofeature/digidollar-v1from
fix/digidollar-sec-004-oracle-id-truncation
Feb 13, 2026
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security: [T1-07] reject oracle_id > 255 to prevent truncation (DGB-SEC-004)#376
JaredTate merged 8 commits intofeature/digidollar-v1from
fix/digidollar-sec-004-oracle-id-truncation

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@gto90 gto90 commented Feb 13, 2026

Summary

  • DGB-SEC-004: Oracle IDs are uint32_t in-memory but serialized as 1 byte in on-chain scripts via & 0xFF. IDs > 255 are silently truncated, causing ID collisions and signature verification failures
  • Fix rejects oracle_id > 255 at two layers: P2P ingestion (IsValidOracleMessage) and script serialization (CreateOracleScript, both Phase One and Phase Two)

Test plan

  • Send oracle message with oracle_id=256 — should be rejected by IsValidOracleMessage()
  • Send oracle message with oracle_id=1 — should still be accepted
  • Run test_digibyte --run_test=oracle_tests

…EC-004)

The on-chain script format stores oracle_id as a single byte (uint8).
The in-memory type is uint32_t. Without validation, IDs > 255 are
silently truncated via `& 0xFF`, causing ID collisions (e.g. oracle
1 and 257 become indistinguishable) and signature verification failures.

Fix adds validation at two layers:
- IsValidOracleMessage(): rejects at P2P ingestion boundary
- CreateOracleScript(): defense-in-depth rejection at serialization
  for both Phase One and Phase Two script formats
Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings February 13, 2026 03:14
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Pull request overview

This PR addresses a critical security vulnerability (DGB-SEC-004) where oracle IDs are stored as uint32_t in memory but serialized as a single byte in on-chain scripts. IDs greater than 255 would be silently truncated via & 0xFF, causing ID collisions and signature verification failures. The fix implements defense-in-depth validation at three layers to reject oracle_id > 255.

Changes:

  • Added validation in IsValidOracleMessage() to reject oracle messages with ID > 255 at P2P ingestion
  • Added defense-in-depth checks in CreateOracleScript() for both Phase One and Phase Two serialization paths
  • All checks include clear security comments referencing DGB-SEC-004

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OpenSSL 1.1.1w Configure misparses multi-word flags like "-arch arm64"
when passed as positional args — the shell splits them and Configure
treats the second word as a target name, causing "target already
defined" on ARM64 macOS. Pass CFLAGS/CPPFLAGS as VAR=value assignments
per OpenSSL's official INSTALL docs.

libcurl 8.5.0 fopen.c uses fileno/fdopen (POSIX) which are hidden by
the depends system's strict -std=c11. Add -D_GNU_SOURCE for Linux.
Use $$ deferred evaluation for CFLAGS/CPPFLAGS assignments so
OS-specific flags (cflags_linux, cppflags_linux) appended by funcs.mk
after set_vars are included. Route -fPIC and -D_GNU_SOURCE through
proper cflags/cppflags variables instead of bare config_opts to avoid
OpenSSL's "Mixing make variables" rejection.
The depends system never defines $(package)_arflags, so
ARFLAGS=$($(package)_arflags) in config_env exported an empty
ARFLAGS="" to the environment. When CFLAGS/CPPFLAGS are passed
as VAR=value assignments (not positional flags), OpenSSL 1.1.1w's
Configure sets $anyuseradd=false and falls back to reading env
vars. The empty ARFLAGS overrides the target default "r" from
Configurations/00-base-templates.conf, producing a Makefile with
ARFLAGS= (empty). This causes "ar: two different operation options
specified" on Linux and "ar: illegal option -- /" on macOS during
build_libs, as ar interprets the archive path as flags.

Fix: remove ARFLAGS from config_env entirely, letting Configure
use its target default ARFLAGS="r".

Verified locally:
- Linux x86_64: ar r apps/libapps.a ... (ARFLAGS=r in Makefile)
- macOS ARM64: ar r apps/libapps.a ... (ARFLAGS=r in Makefile)
- Full build_libs completes successfully on darwin64-arm64-cc
Replace BOOST_CHECK with BOOST_CHECK_MESSAGE in 5 mint validation
tests that fail on CI but pass locally. Diagnostic output captures
the exact reject reason, script sizes, collateral amounts, and
script type identification to help debug the CI-specific failure.
Replace ClearFreeze() with ClearHistory() in the validation test
fixture. ClearFreeze() only clears freeze flags, but UpdateState()
(called during ValidateDigiDollarTransaction) recalculates volatility
from stale price history left by earlier test suites (e.g.,
digidollar_health_tests) and re-sets the freeze. This caused all
"valid mint" tests to fail with "minting-frozen-volatility" on CI
where the test suite ordering (linker-dependent) places health_tests
before validation_tests.

ClearHistory() resets price history, volatility state, and all freeze
flags, ensuring each test starts from a clean state.
The merge with feature/digidollar-v1 silently dropped critical code:

1. DD amount double-counting prevention in ValidateMintTransaction()
   The OP_RETURN and DD token output both encode ddAmount. Without the
   consistency check, totalDD was counted twice (e.g. 10000 + 10000 =
   20000), requiring 2x the collateral and failing all valid mint tests.

2. Missing #include <digidollar/health.h>

3. Improved log format for insufficient-collateral diagnostic

Also adopts the base branch's test file which includes:
- DD OP_RETURN outputs required for T1-04b NUMS verification
- Proper NUMS key usage via GetCollateralNUMSKey()
- ClearHistory() fix for cross-suite volatility state pollution
@DigiSwarm
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Reviewed and merged manually into feature/digidollar-v1 (commit 252bc239a4).

What was applied:

All three defense-in-depth checks from bundle_manager.cpp:

  1. IsValidOracleMessage() — rejects oracle_id > 255 at P2P ingestion with log message
  2. Phase Two CreateOracleScript() — rejects oracle_id > 255 before serialization, returns empty CScript
  3. Phase One CreateOracleScript() — same guard for Phase One path

This prevents the silent & 0xFF truncation that could cause oracle ID collisions and signature verification failures on-chain.

What was NOT applied:

  • Test file changes (digidollar_validation_tests.cpp) — already resolved differently in our test fix commits
  • Build system changes (OpenSSL, ARFLAGS) — unrelated to the security fix

Verification:

  • All 1740 unit tests pass ✅
  • Full build clean ✅

Closing as manually merged. Good catch @gto90 — this was a real gap in our input validation.

@DigiSwarm DigiSwarm closed this Feb 13, 2026
@DigiSwarm DigiSwarm reopened this Feb 13, 2026
@JaredTate JaredTate merged commit feb81c2 into feature/digidollar-v1 Feb 13, 2026
@gto90 gto90 deleted the fix/digidollar-sec-004-oracle-id-truncation branch February 14, 2026 18:18
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3 participants